An interview survey was designed to explore how personnel managers and senior wage negotiators respond to popular models of the labor market. As in A. S. Blinder and D. H. Choi (1990), the authors' results indicate that relative wages and notions of fairness are important, and that this may explain nominal wage rigidity. The authors find much evidence of efficiency wage mechanisms. The reactions to some questions also point to theories based on rent-sharing. Moreover, while underbidding is not that uncommon, firms seem quite unwilling to hire underbidders. The authors also obtain indications of adverse selection problems. Copyright 1995 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
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