Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence From Indonesia
AbstractThe ultimatum game has generated considerable interest because experimental evidence strongly rejects the standard game-theoretic predictions. A limitation to this general result is the possibility that experimental results are an artifact of small stakes. Implementing the ultimatum game in Indonesia makes it possible to raise the stakes to three times the monthly expenditure of the average participant. Even with these sizable incentives, results do not uniformly approach the subgame perfect, selfish outcomes. More specifically, responders become more willing to accept a given percentage offer at higher stakes, but proposer behavior is largely invariant to stake changes. Copyright 1999 by Oxford University Press.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section. in its series Working Papers with number 724.
Date of creation: Jul 1995
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Firestone Library, Princeton, New Jersey 08544-2098
Phone: 609 258-4041
Fax: 609 258-2907
Web page: http://www.irs.princeton.edu/
More information through EDIRC
experimental economics; ultimatum game; large stakes;
Other versions of this item:
- Cameron, Lisa A, 1999. "Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence from Indonesia," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(1), pages 47-59, January.
- B2 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David Long).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.