Group size effects in public goods provision: The voluntary contribution mechanism
AbstractThis paper examines the relationship between variations in group size and "free-riding" behavior in the voluntary provisi on of public goods. The authors examine experimentally two pertinent concepts: the marginal return to an individual from contributions to the public good, and the actual number of members in the group. The r esults strongly support a hypothesis that increasing group size leads to a reduction in allocative efficiency when accompanied by a decrea se in marginal return from the public good (as from crowding or an as sociation of large groups with imperceptibility of marginal benefits). The results do not support a pure numbers-in-the-group effect. Copyright 1988, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 310.
Date of creation: 08 Dec 2010
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- Isaac, R Mark & Walker, James M, 1988. "Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 103(1), pages 179-99, February.
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