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R. Mark Isaac

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Personal Details

First Name: R.
Middle Name: Mark
Last Name: Isaac
Suffix:

RePEc Short-ID: pis15

Email: [This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
Homepage: http://mailer.fsu.edu/~misaac
Postal Address:
Phone:

Affiliation

Department of Economics
Florida State University
Location: Tallahassee, Florida (United States)
Homepage: http://www.fsu.edu/~economic/
Email:
Phone: 850-644-5001
Fax: 644-4535
Postal: 246 Bellamy Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32306-2180
Handle: RePEc:edi:defsuus (more details at EDIRC)

Lists

This author is featured on the following reading lists, publication compilations or Wikipedia entries:
  1. R. Mark Isaac in Wikipedia (English)

Works

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Working papers

  1. Friedman, Daniel & Isaac, R. Mark & James, Duncan & Sunder, Shyam, 2014. "Risky Curves: On the Empirical Failure of Expected Utility," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt87v8k86z, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
  2. R. Mark R. Isaac & Douglas A. Norton, 2011. "Just the Facts Ma'am: A Case Study of the Reversal of Corruption in the Los Angeles Police Department," Working Papers wp2011_08_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
  3. R. M. Isaac & J. M. Walker, 2010. "Group size effects in public goods provision: The voluntary contribution mechanism," Levine's Working Paper Archive 310, David K. Levine.
  4. R. M Isaac & J. Walker & A. Williams, 2010. "Group Size and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence Utilizing Very Large Groups," Levine's Working Paper Archive 11, David K. Levine.
  5. Mark Isaac & Svetlana Pevnitskaya & Tim C. Salmon, 2008. "Individual Behavior In Auctions with Price Proportional Benefits," Working Papers wp2008_07_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
  6. R. Mark Isaac & Svetlana Pevnitskaya & Kurt Schnier, 2008. "Individual Behaavior and Bidding Heterogeneity in Sealed Bid Auctions Where the Number of Bidders is Unknown," Working Papers wp2008_07_02, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
  7. R. Mark Isaac & Timothy C. Salmon & Arthur Zillante, 2004. "A Theory of Jump Bidding in Ascending Auctions," Game Theory and Information 0404002, EconWPA.
  8. Forsythe, Robert & Isaac, R. Mark & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1987. "Theories and Tests of (Blind Bidding) in Sealed Bid Auctions," Working Papers 670, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  9. Isaac, R. Mark., 1980. "Cooperative Institutions for Sharing in the Oil Industry," Working Papers 308, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  10. Isaac, R. Mark., 1979. "Fuel Cost Adjustment Mechanisms and the Regulated Utility Facing Uncertain Fuel Prices," Working Papers 273, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  11. Isaac, R. Mark., 1979. "Petroleum Price Controls When Information Is a Joint Product," Working Papers 251, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  12. Calvert, Randall L. & Isaac, R. Mark., 1978. "The Inherent Disadvantage of the Presidential Party in Midterm Congressional Elections," Working Papers 191, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  13. Grether, David M. & Isaac, R. Mark & Plott, Charles R., . "The Allocation of Landing Rights by Unanimity among Competitors," Working Papers 350, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  14. Isaac, R. Mark & McCue, Kenneth F. & Plott, Charles R., . "Public Goods Provision in an Experimental Environment," Working Papers 428, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  15. Isaac, R. Mark & Plott, Charles R., . "Price Controls and the Behavior of Auction Markets: An Experimental Examination," Working Papers 253, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  16. Forsythe, Robert & Isaac, R. Mark., . "Demand-Revealing Mechanisms for Private Good Auctions," Working Papers 351, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  17. Isaac, R. Mark & Plott, Charles R., . "Cooperative Game Models of the Influence of the Closed Rule in Three Person, Majority Rule Committees: Theory and Experiment," Working Papers 181, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  18. Isaac, R. Mark & Plott, Charles R., . "The Opportunity for Conspiracy in Restraint of Trade: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 255, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.

Articles

  1. R. Isaac & Douglas Norton, 2013. "Endogenous institutions and the possibility of reverse crowding out," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 253-284, July.
  2. Mark Isaac & Svetlana Pevnitskaya & Kurt S. Schnier, 2012. "Individual Behavior And Bidding Heterogeneity In Sealed Bid Auctions Where The Number Of Bidders Is Unknown," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 50(2), pages 516-533, 04.
  3. Douglas Norton & R. Isaac, 2012. "Experts with a conflict of interest: a source of ambiguity?," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 260-277, June.
  4. Sean M. Collins & R. Mark Isaac, 2012. "Holdout: Existence, Information, and Contingent Contracting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(4), pages 793 - 814.
  5. R. Isaac, 2011. "Rebecca B. Morton, Kenneth C. Williams: Experimental political science and the study of causality: from nature to the lab," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 263-264, July.
  6. Ahn, T.K. & Isaac, R. Mark & Salmon, Timothy C., 2011. "Rent seeking in groups," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 116-125, January.
  7. R. Isaac & Svetlana Pevnitskaya & Timothy Salmon, 2010. "Do preferences for charitable giving help auctioneers?," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 14-44, March.
  8. Ahn, T.K. & Isaac, R. Mark & Salmon, Timothy C., 2009. "Coming and going: Experiments on endogenous group sizes for excludable public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-2), pages 336-351, February.
  9. T. K. Ahn & R. Mark Isaac & Timothy C. Salmon, 2008. "Endogenous Group Formation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(2), pages 171-194, 04.
  10. Isaac, R. Mark & Salmon, Timothy C. & Zillante, Arthur, 2007. "A theory of jump bidding in ascending auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 144-164, January.
  11. R. Mark Isaac & Kurt Schnier, 2005. "Silent Auctions in the Field and in the Laboratory," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 43(4), pages 715-733, October.
  12. R. Isaac & Timothy Salmon & Arthur Zillante, 2005. "An experimental test of alternative models of bidding in ascending auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 287-313, 06.
  13. R. Mark Isaac & Duncan James, 2003. "Boundaries of the Tournament Pricing Effect in Asset Markets: Evidence from Experimental Markets," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 69(4), pages 936-951, April.
  14. R. Isaac & Duncan James, 2000. "Robustness of the Incentive Compatible Combinatorial Auction," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 31-53, June.
  15. R. Mark Isaac & Duncan James, 2000. "Asset Markets: How They Are Affected by Tournament Incentives for Individuals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 995-1004, September.
  16. Isaac, R Mark & James, Duncan, 2000. " Just Who Are You Calling Risk Averse?," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 177-87, March.
  17. Attiyeh, Greg & Franciosi, Robert & Isaac, R Mark, 2000. " Experiments with the Pivot Process for Providing Public Goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 102(1-2), pages 95-114, January.
  18. R. Isaac & James Walker, 1998. "Nash as an Organizing Principle in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 191-206, December.
  19. David L. Dickinson & R. Mark Isaac, 1998. "Absolute and relative rewards for individuals in team production," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(4-5), pages 299-310.
  20. Isaac, R. Mark & Walker, James M. & Williams, Arlington W., 1994. "Group size and the voluntary provision of public goods : Experimental evidence utilizing large groups," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 1-36, May.
  21. Reynolds, Stanley S & Isaac, R Mark, 1992. "Stochastic Innovation and Product Market Organization," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 525-45, October.
  22. Isaac, R. Mark & Reynolds, Stanley S., 1992. "Schumpeterian competition in experimental markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 59-100, January.
  23. Isaac, R Mark, 1991. "Price Cap Regulation: A Case Study of Some Pitfalls of Implementation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 193-210, June.
  24. R. Isaac & Deborah Mathieu & Edward Zajac, 1991. "Institutional framing and perceptions of fairness," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 329-370, September.
  25. R. Isaac & David Schmidtz & James Walker, 1989. "The assurance problem in a laboratory market," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 62(3), pages 217-236, September.
  26. Isaac, R. Mark, 1989. "Price level regulation for diversified public utilities: Jordan Jay Millman and Ronald R. Braeutigam, (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, 1989)," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 271-273.
  27. Mark Isaac, 1989. "Book Review - Regulation and Market," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4).
  28. Robert Forsythe & R. Mark Isaac & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1989. "Theories and Tests of "Blind Bidding" in Sealed-Bid Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(2), pages 214-238, Summer.
  29. Isaac, R Mark & Walker, James M, 1988. "Communication and Free-Riding Behavior: The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 26(4), pages 585-608, October.
  30. Isaac, R Mark & Reynolds, Stanley S, 1988. "Appropriability and Market Structure in a Stochastic Invention Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(4), pages 647-71, November.
  31. Isaac, R Mark & Walker, James M, 1988. "Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(1), pages 179-99, February.
  32. Isaac, R. Mark, 1987. "Cooperative institutions for information sharing in the oil industry," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 191-211, September.
  33. James C. Cox & R. Mark Isaac, 1987. "Mechanisms for Incentive Regulation: Theory and Experiment," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 348-359, Autumn.
  34. Isaac, R. Mark, 1987. "The value of information in resource exploration: The interaction of strategic plays and institutional rules," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 313-322, December.
  35. Cox, James C & Isaac, R Mark, 1986. "In Search of the Winner's Curse: Reply," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 24(3), pages 517-20, July.
  36. Isaac, R Mark & Smith, Vernon L, 1985. "In Search of Predatory Pricing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(2), pages 320-45, April.
  37. Mark Isaac, R. & McCue, Kenneth F. & Plott, Charles R., 1985. "Public goods provision in an experimental environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 51-74, February.
  38. Isaac, R. Mark & Walker, James M., 1985. "Information and conspiracy in sealed bid auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 139-159, June.
  39. Coursey, Don & Isaac, R Mark & Smith, Vernon L, 1984. "Natural Monopoly and Contested Markets: Some Experimental Results," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 91-113, April.
  40. Cox, James C & Isaac, R Mark, 1984. "In Search of the Winner's Curse," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 22(4), pages 579-92, October.
  41. Don Coursey & R. Mark Isaac & Margaret Luke & Vernon L. Smith, 1984. "Market Contestability in the Presence of Sunk (Entry) Costs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(1), pages 69-84, Spring.
  42. Isaac, R. Mark & Ramey, Valerie & Williams, Arlington W., 1984. "The effects of market organization on conspiracies in restraint of trade," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 191-222, June.
  43. R. Isaac & James Walker & Susan Thomas, 1984. "Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 113-149, January.
  44. R. Mark Isaac, 1982. "Fuel Cost Adjustment Mechanisms and the Regulated Utility Facing Uncertain Fuel Prices," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 158-169, Spring.
  45. Grether, David M & Isaac, R Mark & Plott, Charles R, 1981. "The Allocation of Landing Rights by Unanimity among Competitors," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(2), pages 166-71, May.
  46. Randall Calvert & R. Isaac, 1981. "The inherent disadvantage of the presidential party in midterm congressional elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 141-146, January.
  47. Isaac, R. Mark & Plott, Charles R., 1981. "The opportunity for conspiracy in restraint of trade : An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 1-30, March.
  48. Isaac, R Mark & Plott, Charles R, 1981. "Price Controls and the Behavior of Auction Markets: An Experimental Examination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 448-59, June.
  49. R. Mark Isaac, 1980. "Petroleum Price Controls When Information Is a Joint Product," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 56(2), pages 181-187.

Chapters

  1. Cox, James C. & Isaac, R. Mark, 2008. "Experiments in Decentralized Monopoly Restraint," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Elsevier.
  2. Cox, James C. & Isaac, R. Mark, 2008. "Procurement Contracting," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Elsevier.

NEP Fields

7 papers by this author were announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):
  1. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2004-04-25
  2. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (2) 2008-07-20 2008-07-20. Author is listed
  3. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (2) 2008-07-20 2008-07-20. Author is listed
  4. NEP-HIS: Business, Economic & Financial History (1) 2011-09-16
  5. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2004-04-25
  6. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (2) 2010-12-18 2010-12-18. Author is listed
  7. NEP-PUB: Public Finance (1) 2010-12-18
  8. NEP-UPT: Utility Models & Prospect Theory (2) 2008-07-20 2014-06-07. Author is listed

Statistics

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
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  5. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  6. Number of Citations
  7. Number of Citations, Discounted by Citation Age
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  9. Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
  10. Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  11. Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
  12. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors
  13. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors, Discounted by Citation Age
  14. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  15. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  16. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  17. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  18. h-index
  19. Number of Registered Citing Authors
  20. Number of Registered Citing Authors, Weighted by Rank (Max. 1 per Author)
  21. Number of Journal Pages
  22. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  23. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  24. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors
  25. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  26. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  27. Breadth of citations across fields
  28. Wu-Index

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