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Endogenous Group Formation

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Author Info

  • T. K. AHN
  • R. MARK ISAAC
  • TIMOTHY C. SALMON

Abstract

While the rules governing the formation of groups engaging in collective action may have significant impact on group size and behavior of members, most experiments on public goods have been conducted with the subjects in exogenously fixed groups or of fixed sizes. We study endogenous formation of groups in a public-goods provision game by allowing subjects to change groups under three sets of rules: free entry/exit, restricted entry with free exit, and free entry with restricted exit. We find that the rules governing entry and exit do have a significant impact on individual behavior and group-level outcomes. Copyright 2008 Blackwell Publishing, Inc..

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 10 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (04)
Pages: 171-194

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Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:10:y:2008:i:2:p:171-194

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Emmanuel Sol & Sylvie Thoron & Marc Willinger, 2007. "Do binding agreements solve the social dilemma?," Working Papers 07-09, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Oct 2007.
  2. Kjell Arne Brekke & Karen Evelyn Hauge & Jo Thori Lind & Karine Nyborg, 2009. "Playing with the Good Guys - A Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation," CESifo Working Paper Series 2647, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Nicholas E. Burger & Charles D. Kolstad, 2009. "Voluntary Public Goods Provision, Coalition Formation, and Uncertainty," NBER Working Papers 15543, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Königstein, Manfred & Ruchala, Gabriele K., 2007. "Performance Pay, Group Selection and Group Performance," IZA Discussion Papers 2697, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  5. Reeson, Andrew F. & Tisdell, John G. & McAllister, Ryan R.J., 2011. "Trust, reputation and relationships in grazing rights markets: An experimental economic study," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(4), pages 651-658, February.
  6. Gürerk, Özgür & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Rockenbach, Bettina, 2009. "Voting with Feet: Community Choice in Social Dilemmas," IZA Discussion Papers 4643, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  7. Timothy C. Salmon & Roberto A. Weber, 2011. "Maintaining efficiency while integrating entrants from lower-performing environments: an experimental study," ECON - Working Papers 035, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
  8. Kaplan, Jonathan D. & Howitt, Richard E. & Kroll, Stephan, 2012. "Private Provision of a Stochastic Common Property Resource," 2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington 124855, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  9. Eva Ranehill & Frédéric Schneider & Roberto A. Weber, 2012. "Growing groups, cooperation, and the rate of entry," ECON - Working Papers 103, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
  10. Charness, Gary B & Yang, Chun-Lei, 2008. "Endogenous Group Formation and Public Goods Provision: Exclusion, Exit, Mergers, and Redemption," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt0hx472pn, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  11. Gunnthorsdottir, Anna & Vragov, Roumen & Seifert, Stefan & McCabe, Kevin, 2010. "Near-efficient equilibria in contribution-based competitive grouping," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(11-12), pages 987-994, December.
  12. Ahn, T.K. & Isaac, R. Mark & Salmon, Timothy C., 2009. "Coming and going: Experiments on endogenous group sizes for excludable public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-2), pages 336-351, February.
  13. Gunnthorsdottir, Anna & Vragov, Roumen & seifert, Stefan & McCabe, Kevin, 2008. "on the efficiency of team-based meritocracies," MPRA Paper 8627, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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