Theories and Tests of "Blind Bidding" in Sealed-Bid Auctions
AbstractIn this article we report the results from a series of laboratory markets in which sellers have better information about the quality of an item than any of the potential buyers. Sellers may voluntarily choose to reveal this information or they may instead decide to "blind bid" the item. We find that a sequential equilibrium model where buyers "assume the worst" is a good predictor of behavior in these simple markets. This equilibrium is not instantaneously attained, however, but there is an unravelling process which describes how this equilibrium is approached. At the conclusion of the market, allocations tend to be fully efficient, ex post.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 20 (1989)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.rje.org
Other versions of this item:
- Forsythe, Robert & Isaac, R. Mark & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1987. "Theories and Tests of (Blind Bidding) in Sealed Bid Auctions," Working Papers 670, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ackert, Lucy F. & Church, Bryan K. & Sankar, Mandira Roy, 2000.
"Voluntary disclosure under imperfect competition: experimental evidence,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 81-105, January.
- Lucy F. Ackert & Bryan K. Church & Mandira Roy Sankar, 1998. "Voluntary disclosure under imperfect competition: Experimental evidence," Working Paper 98-7, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2000.
"Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
00-045/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Theo Offerman, 2002. "Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 625-643, June.
- Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2000. "Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study," Virginia Economics Online Papers 347, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
- Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D & Palfrey, Thomas R, 2009. "Information Gatekeepers: Theory and Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 7457, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Erik Eyster & Matthew Rabin, 2005.
Econometric Society, vol. 73(5), pages 1623-1672, 09.
- Eyster, Erik & Rabin, Matthew, 2002. "Cursed Equilibrium," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt7p2911dn, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Erik Eyster & Matt Rabin, 2003. "Cursed Equilibrium," Method and Hist of Econ Thought 0303002, EconWPA.
- Eyster, Erik & Rabin, Matt, 2002. "Cursed Equilibrium," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt6xf4782t, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Benndorf, Volker & Kübler, Dorothea & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2013.
"Privacy concerns, voluntary disclosure of information, and unraveling: An experiment,"
Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior
SP II 2013-208, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Volker Benndorf & Dorothea Kübler & Hans-Theo Normann, 2013. "Privacy Concerns, Voluntary Disclosure of Information, and Unraveling: An Experiment," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2013-040, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
- David Porter & Roumen Vragov, 2006. "An experimental examination of demand reduction in multi-unit versions of the Uniform-price, Vickrey, and English auctions," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(6), pages 445-458.
- Carrillo, Juan D & Palfrey, Thomas R, 2007. "The Compromise Game: Two-sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory," CEPR Discussion Papers 6103, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Juan D Carrillo & Thomas R Palfrey, 2007. "The Compromise Game: Two-Sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001463, UCLA Department of Economics.
- James G. Mulligan & Daniel J. Wedzielewski, 2012. "Government Intervention to Prevent Bankruptcy: the Effect of Blind-Bidding Laws on Movie Theaters," Working Papers 12-03, University of Delaware, Department of Economics.
- Juan D. Carrillo & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2007. "The Compromise Game: Two-sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000754, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Boeheim, Rene & Zulehner, Christine, 1996. "Auctions - A Survey," Economics Series 39, Institute for Advanced Studies.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.