A Theory of Jump Bidding in Ascending Auctions
Abstract
Jump bidding is a commonly observed phenomenon that involves bidders in ascending auctions submitting bids higher than required by the auctioneer. Such behavior is typically explained as due to irrationality or to bidders signaling their value. We present field data that suggests such explanations are unsatisfactory and construct an alternative model in which jump bidding occurs due to strategic concerns and impatience. We go on to examine the impact of jump bidding on the outcome of ascending auctions in an attempt to resolve some policy disputes in the design of ascending auctions.Download Info
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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0404002.Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 22 Apr 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0404002
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 29
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Related research
Keywords: auction theory; ascending auctions; jump bidding;Other versions of this item:
- Isaac, R. Mark & Salmon, Timothy C. & Zillante, Arthur, 2007. "A theory of jump bidding in ascending auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 144-164, January.
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-04-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2004-04-25 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-MIC-2004-04-25 (Microeconomics)
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Brennan C. Platt & Joseph Price & Henry Tappen, 2010. "Pay-to-Bid Auctions," NBER Working Papers 15695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- David Grether & David Porter & Matthew Shum, 2011. "Intimidation or Impatience? Jump Bidding in On-line Ascending Automobile Auctions," Working Papers 11-07, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Ricardo Gonçalves & John D Hey, 2007. "Experimental Evidence on English Auctions: Oral Outcry vs. Clock," Discussion Papers 07/09, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Ricardo Gonçalves, 2008. "A communication equilibrium in English auctions with discrete bidding," Working Papers de Economia (Economics Working Papers) 042008, Faculdade de Economia e Gestão, Universidade Católica Portuguesa (Porto).
- Dror Lellouche & Assaf Romm, 2009. "Information Effects of Jump Bidding in English Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp526, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Carpenter, Jeffrey & Holmes, Jessica & Matthews, Peter Hans, 2011.
"Jumping and sniping at the silents: Does it matter for charities?,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 95(5-6), pages 395-402, June.
- Carpenter, Jeffrey & Holmes, Jessica & Matthews, Peter Hans, 2011. "Jumping and sniping at the silents: Does it matter for charities?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(5), pages 395-402.
- Jason Shachat & J. Todd Swarthout, 2003.
"Procurement Auctions for Differentiated Goods,"
Experimental
0310004, EconWPA.
- Jason Shachat & J. Todd Swarthout, 2003. "Procurement Auctions for Differentiated Goods," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2006-15, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, revised Apr 2009.
- James T. Swarthout & Jason Shachat, 2004. "Procurement Auctions for Differentiated Goods," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 629, Econometric Society.
- Plott, Charles R. & Salmon, Timothy C., 2004.
"The simultaneous, ascending auction: dynamics of price adjustment in experiments and in the UK3G spectrum auction,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 353-383, March.
- Plott, Charles R. & Salmon, Timothy, 2002. "The Simultaneous, Ascending Auction: Dynamics of Price Adjustment in Experiments and in the U.K. 3G Spectrum Auction," Working Papers 1155, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Douglas D. Davis & Laura Razzolini & Robert Reilly & Bart J. Wilson, 2003. "Raising Revenues for Charity: Auctions versus Lotteries," Working Papers 0301, VCU School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Katerina Sherstyuk, 2011. "Complexity and bidder behavior in iterative auctions," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(4), pages 2769-2776.
- J. Todd Swarthout & Jason Shachat, 2004. "The performance of reverse auctions versus request for quotes when procuring goods with quality differences," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 255, Econometric Society.
- Anthony M. Kwasnica & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2013. "Multi-Unit Auctions," Working Papers 201301, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
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