Jumping and sniping at the silents: Does it matter for charities?
AbstractDespite its popularity as a fundraiser for charities, very little research has been done on the bidding and revenue properties of the silent auction. This paper examines the consequences of two behaviors common in silent auctions, jump-bidding and sniping, in laboratory experiments with endogenous participation. Our results suggest that deliberative jumping, the result of impatient bidders attempting to telescope time, tends to increase revenue, while deliberative sniping by experienced bidders tends to decrease it. We also show that when charities can encourage jumping and discourage sniping, silent auctions can perform as well as their sometimes more entertaining but more expensive alternative, the English auction.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.
Volume (Year): 95 (2011)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578
Charity; Silent auction; Revenue proportional benefits; Endogenous participation; Jump-bidding; Sniping;
Other versions of this item:
- Carpenter, Jeffrey & Holmes, Jessica & Matthews, Peter Hans, 2011. "Jumping and sniping at the silents: Does it matter for charities?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(5-6), pages 395-402, June.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Isaac, R. Mark & Salmon, Timothy C. & Zillante, Arthur, 2007.
"A theory of jump bidding in ascending auctions,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 144-164, January.
- Duffy, John & Ünver, M.Utku, 2008.
"Internet auctions with artificial adaptive agents: A study on market design,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 394-417, August.
- John Duffy & M. Utku Unver, 2005. "Internet Auctions with Artificial Adaptive Agents: A Study on Market Design," Computational Economics 0510001, EconWPA, revised 07 Oct 2005.
- M.Utku Unver & John Dufffy, 2005. "Internet Auctions with Artificial Adaptive Agents: A Study on Market Design," Working Papers 260, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2005.
- Jeffrey Carpenter & Jessica Holmes & Peter Hans Matthews, 2007.
"Endogenous Participation in Charity Auctions,"
Middlebury College Working Paper Series
0707, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
- Rothkopf, Michael H. & Harstad, Ronald M., 1994. "On the role of discrete bid levels in oral auctions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 572-581, May.
- Robert F. Easley & Rafael Tenorio, 2004. "Jump Bidding Strategies in Internet Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 50(10), pages 1407-1419, October.
- Karla Hoff & Priyanka Pandey, 2006. "Discrimination, Social Identity, and Durable Inequalities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 206-211, May.
- Jeffrey C. Ely & Tanjim Hossain, 2009. "Sniping and Squatting in Auction Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 68-94, August.
- Plott, Charles R. & Salmon, Timothy, 2002.
"The Simultaneous, Ascending Auction: Dynamics of Price Adjustment in Experiments and in the U.K. 3G Spectrum Auction,"
1155, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Plott, Charles R. & Salmon, Timothy C., 2004. "The simultaneous, ascending auction: dynamics of price adjustment in experiments and in the UK3G spectrum auction," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 353-383, March.
- R. Isaac & Timothy Salmon & Arthur Zillante, 2005. "An experimental test of alternative models of bidding in ascending auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 287-313, 06.
- Ockenfels, Axel & Roth, Alvin E., 2006.
"Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 297-320, May.
- Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth, 2003. "Late and Multiple Bidding in Second Price Internet Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction," CESifo Working Paper Series 992, CESifo Group Munich.
- R. Mark Isaac & Kurt Schnier, 2005. "Silent Auctions in the Field and in the Laboratory," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 43(4), pages 715-733, October.
- Avery, Christopher, 1998. "Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(2), pages 185-210, April.
- Paulo K. Monteiro & Flavio M. Menezes, 2000. "original papers : Auctions with endogenous participation," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 71-89.
- Arthur J.H.C. Schram & Sander Onderstal, 2009. "Bidding To Give: An Experimental Comparison Of Auctions For Charity," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 50(2), pages 431-457, 05.
- Jacob K. Goeree & Emiel Maasland & Sander Onderstal & John L. Turner, 2005. "How (Not) to Raise Money," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(4), pages 897-926, August.
- Paul Klemperer, 2004.
"Auctions: Theory and Practice,"
2004-W09, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Introduction to Auctions: Theory and Practice," Introductory Chapters, in: Auctions: Theory and Practice Princeton University Press.
- Ku, Gillian & Malhotra, Deepak & Murnighan, J. Keith, 2005. "Towards a competitive arousal model of decision-making: A study of auction fever in live and Internet auctions," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 89-103, March.
- Christopher Cotton, 2009. "Sniping to Avoid the Endowment Eect in Auctions," Working Papers 2010-13, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
- Yaron Raviv, 2008. "The Role Of The Bidding Process In Price Determination: Jump Bidding In Sequential English Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 46(3), pages 325-341, 07.
- Uri Gneezy & Muriel Niederle & Aldo Rustichini, 2003. "Performance In Competitive Environments: Gender Differences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(3), pages 1049-1074, August.
- Smith, Vernon L, 1976. "Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 274-79, May.
- Banks, Jeffrey & Olson, Mark & Porter, David & Rassenti, Stephen & Smith, Vernon, 2003. "Theory, experiment and the federal communications commission spectrum auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 303-350, July.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wendy Shamier).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.