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Procurement Auctions for Differentiated Goods

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Author Info
Jason Shachat (National University of Singapore)
J. Todd Swarthout (University of Arizona)

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Abstract

We consider two mechanisms to procure differentiated goods: a request for quote and an English auction with bidding credits. In the request for quote, each seller submits a price and the inherent quality of his good. Then the buyer selects the seller who offers the greatest difference in quality and price. In the English auction with bidding credits, the buyer assigns a bidding credit to each seller conditional upon the quality of the seller’s good. Then the sellers compete in an English auction with the winner receiving the auction price and his bidding credit. Game theoretic models predict the request for quote is socially efficient but the English auction with bidding credits is not. The optimal bidding credit assignment under compensates for quality advantages, creating a market distortion in which the buyer captures surplus at the expense of the seller’s profit and social efficiency. In experiments, the request for quote is less efficient than the English auctions with bidding credits. Moreover, both the buyer and seller receive more surplus in the English auction with bidding credits.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Experimental with number 0310004.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 13 Oct 2003
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0310004

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 33
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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L - Industrial Organization

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1989. "Government procurement and international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3-4), pages 291-308, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  3. Davidson, Russell & MacKinnon, James G, 1981. "Several Tests for Model Specification in the Presence of Alternative Hypotheses," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(3), pages 781-93, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 2003. "Optimal Design of Research Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 646-671, June. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Yeon-Koo Che, 1993. "Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(4), pages 668-680, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Richard L. Fullerton & Bruce G. Linster & Michael McKee & Stephen Slate, 2002. "Using Auctions To Reward Tournament Winners: Theory and Experimental Investigations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(1), pages 62-84, Spring.
  8. Allan Corns & Andrew Schotter, 1999. "Can Affirmative Action Be Cost Effective? An Experimental Examination of Price-Preference Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 291-305, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2002. "Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 625-643, June. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Dasgupta, Sudipto & Spulber, Daniel F., 1989. "Managing procurement auctions," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 5-29. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. R. Mark Isaac & Timothy C. Salmon & Arthur Zillante, 2004. "A Theory of Jump Bidding in Ascending Auctions," Game Theory and Information 0404002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. R. Mark Isaac & Timothy C. Salmon & Arthur Zillante, 2004. "A Theory of Jump Bidding in Ascending Auctions," Game Theory and Information 0404002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Nicola Doni, 2007. "A Comparison of Alternative Procedures for the Selection of the Private Partner in PPP Projects," Working Papers Series wp2007_10, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche. [Downloadable!]
  3. Mark Isaac & Svetlana Pevnitskaya & Tim C. Salmon, 2008. "Individual Behavior In Auctions with Price Proportional Benefits," Working Papers wp2008_07_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Shu-Heng Chen & Chung-Ching Tai, 2006. "Republication: On the Selection of Adaptive Algorithms in ABM: A Computational-Equivalence Approach," Computational Economics, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 313-331, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Shu-Heng Chen & Chung-Ching Tai, 2006. "On the Selection of Adaptive Algorithms in ABM: A Computational-Equivalence Approach," Computational Economics, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 51-69, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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