This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Silent Auctions in the Field and in the Laboratory

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
R. Mark Isaac
Kurt Schnier

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We analyze data from hundreds of auctions from three field silent auction sessions. We focus on the descriptive statistics and on a parametric model of jump bidding. We then report data from six laboratory sessions of silent auctions. As a controlled environment, this allows us to evaluate the auctions in ways not available within the field. The laboratory experiments capture essential features of the field sessions and thus comprise a credible laboratory testbed for further examination of institutional perturbations in the silent auction. (JEL D44, H41) Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ei/cbi050
File Format: text/html
File Function:
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 43 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 715-733
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:43:y:2005:i:4:p:715-733

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Fax: 01865 267 985
Email:
Web page: http://ei.oupjournals.org/

Order Information:
Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. R. Mark Isaac & Svetlana Pevnitskaya & Kurt Schnier, 2008. "Individual Behaavior and Bidding Heterogeneity in Sealed Bid Auctions Where the Number of Bidders is Unknown," Working Papers wp2008_07_02, Department of Economics, Florida State University. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? To receive notification of recent additions to the database, subscribe to the free NEP reports.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-19.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.