Mechanisms for Incentive Regulation: Theory and Experiment
AbstractThis article develops the theoretical properties of a new incentive mechanism for regulating a monopoly seller and reports the results of laboratory experimental tests of its behavioral properties. The design of the new mechanism draws upon the results of our earlier experimental research on the behavioral properties of two other mechanisms, one by Loeb and Magat (1979) and a second by Finsinger and Vogelsang (1981). As with Finsinger and Vogelsang, the new mechanism weakens Loeb and Magat's requirement that regulators have complete knowledge of market demand. The new mechanism, however, is not subject to the destabilizing, profit-destroying cycles of nonoptimal behavior observed with Finsinger and Vogelsang's.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 18 (1987)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
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Web page: http://www.rje.org
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- Jim Engle-Warnick & Bradley Ruffle, 2002.
"Buyer Countervailing Power versus Monopoly Power: Evidence from Experimental Posted-Offer Markets,"
Economics Papers, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford
2002-W14, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Jim Engle-Warnick & Bradley J Ruffle, 2002. "Buyer Countervailing Power versus Monopoly Power: Evidence from Experimental Posted-Offer Markets," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics 2002-W14, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Lantz, Bjorn, 2007. "A non-Bayesian piecewise linear approximation adjustment process for incentive regulation," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 95-101, March.
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