IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v71y1981i2p166-71.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Allocation of Landing Rights by Unanimity among Competitors

Author

Listed:
  • Grether, David M
  • Isaac, R Mark
  • Plott, Charles R

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Grether, David M & Isaac, R Mark & Plott, Charles R, 1981. "The Allocation of Landing Rights by Unanimity among Competitors," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(2), pages 166-171, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:71:y:1981:i:2:p:166-71
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28198105%2971%3A2%3C166%3ATAOLRB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W&origin=repec
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Glenn W. Harrison & John A. List, 2004. "Field Experiments," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(4), pages 1009-1055, December.
    2. John Ledyard & Charles Noussair & David Porter, 1996. "The allocation of a shared resource within an organization," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 163-192, December.
    3. Pickl, Matthias & Wirl, Franz, 2011. "Auction design for gas pipeline transportation capacity--The case of Nabucco and its open season," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 2143-2151, April.
    4. Button, Kenneth, 2005. "A simple analysis of the rent seeking of airlines, airports and politicians," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 47-56, January.
    5. Paul Healy & John Ledyard & Charles Noussair & Harley Thronson & Peter Ulrich & Giulio Varsi, 2007. "Contracting inside an organization: An experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 143-167, June.
    6. Alessandro Avenali & Tiziana D'Alfonso & Claudio Leporelli & Giorgio Matteucci & Alberto Nastasi & Pierfrancesco Reverberi, 2014. "A supervised market mechanism for efficient airport slot allocation," DIAG Technical Reports 2014-03, Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza".
    7. Anthony M. Kwasnica & John O. Ledyard & Dave Porter & Christine DeMartini, 2005. "A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(3), pages 419-434, March.
    8. Claude Montmarquette & David Masclet & Pierre Malgrange & Laurent Denant-Boèmont, 2008. "Économie expérimentale, outil d'aide à la décision. Présentation générale," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 182(1), pages 1-6.
    9. Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2011. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier.
    10. Bastian Henze & Charles Noussair & Bert Willems, 2012. "Regulation of network infrastructure investments: an experimental evaluation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 1-38, August.
    11. Katerina Sherstyuk & Nina Karmanskaya & Pavel Teslia, 2016. "Bidding with money or action plans? Asset allocation under strategic uncertainty," Working Papers 201603, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    12. Brosig, Jeannette, 2006. "Communication channels and induced behavior," MPRA Paper 14035, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Lansdell, Nicola & Stoneham, Gary, 2006. "Designing Market Based Instruments: Beyond Round One of the Australian MBI Pilot Program," 2006 Annual Meeting, August 12-18, 2006, Queensland, Australia 25743, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    14. Hans-Theo Normann & Roberto Ricciuti, 2009. "Laboratory Experiments For Economic Policy Making," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(3), pages 407-432, July.
    15. Gary Bolton & Ben Greiner & Axel Ockenfels, 2013. "Engineering Trust: Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(2), pages 265-285, January.
    16. Zonna, Davide, 2016. "Sprechi di cibo e tentativi di riduzione. Un caso sperimentale
      [Avoiding food waste. A field experiment]
      ," MPRA Paper 76097, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2013. "Competition for procurement shares," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 193-208.
    18. Régis Deloche, 1995. "Expérimentation, science économique et théorie des jeux : "Nunc est bibendum" ," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 46(3), pages 951-960.
    19. repec:aeg:report:2014-3 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Briggs, María Cristina & Petrecolla, Diego, 2001. "Problemas de competencia en la asignación de la capacidad de los aeropuertos. El Caso Argentino," UADE Textos de Discusión 24_2001, Instituto de Economía, Universidad Argentina de la Empresa.
    21. Sulin Ba & Jan Stallaert & Andrew B. Whinston, 2001. "Optimal Investment in Knowledge Within a Firm Using a Market Mechanism," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 47(9), pages 1203-1219, September.
    22. Ortmann, Andreas, 2003. "Charles R. Plott's collected papers on the experimental foundations of economic and political science," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 555-575, August.
    23. Ronald R. Braeutigam, 1990. "Regulatory Reform: Lessons For Natural Gas Pipelines," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 8(2), pages 122-141, April.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:71:y:1981:i:2:p:166-71. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros) or (Michael P. Albert). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.