Communication and Free-Riding Behavior: The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism
AbstractThe authors experimentally examine the role of active communication as a mechanism for improving economic efficiency in a voluntary-contribution, public-goods environment. With no communication, this environment has been shown to induce significant suboptimality, approaching zero contributions with iteration of the decision environment. Communication is shown to significantly improve group optimality. The authors examine the robustness of their results in increasingly complex environments and in environments in which there has been a history of communication, but in which active communication is no longer available. Copyright 1988 by Oxford University Press.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 26 (1988)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://ei.oupjournals.org/
More information through EDIRC
You can help add them by filling out this form.
Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Cooperation versus self-interest: the theory of collective action and its relevance to project management
by K in Eight to Late on 2009-12-02 22:09:00
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.