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Giving according to GARP: an experimental study of rationality and altruism

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  • James Andreoni
  • John H Miller

Abstract

Altruism and fainess are thought to be important in many economic situations. This paper asks whether atruistic choices can be captured in a simple neoclassical framework with well-behaved preferences for giving.

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File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/giving_a.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 672.

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Date of creation: 01 Aug 1997
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:672

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References

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  1. Bolton, Gary E, 1991. "A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1096-136, December.
  2. Croson, Rachel T. A., 1996. "Partners and strangers revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 25-32, October.
  3. Alvin E. Roth & V. Prasnikar & M. Okuno-Fujiwara & S. Zamir, 1998. "Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Liubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: an experimental study," Levine's Working Paper Archive 344, David K. Levine.
  4. Andreoni, James, 1995. "Warm-Glow versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative Framing on Cooperation in Experiments," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 110(1), pages 1-21, February.
  5. Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L & Thaler, Richard, 1986. "Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 728-41, September.
  6. Andereoni, J., 1988. "Why Free Ride? Strategies And Learning In Public Goods Experiments," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems 375, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  7. David K. Levine, 1998. "Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(3), pages 593-622, July.
  8. Miller, John H., 1996. "The coevolution of automata in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 87-112, January.
  9. M. Rabin, 2001. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 511, David K. Levine.
  10. Isaac, R Mark & Walker, James M, 1988. "Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 103(1), pages 179-99, February.
  11. Andreoni, J., 1990. "An Experimental Test Of The Public Goods Crowding-Out Hypothesis," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems 9006, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  12. Schokkaert, Erik & Lagrou, Leo, 1983. "An empirical approach to distributive justice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 33-52, June.
  13. Forsythe Robert & Horowitz Joel L. & Savin N. E. & Sefton Martin, 1994. "Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 347-369, May.
  14. Varian, H.R., 1991. "Goodness of Fit for Revealed Preference Tests," Papers, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory 13, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  15. Hoffman, Elizabeth & McCabe, Kevin A & Smith, Vernon L, 1996. "On Expectations and the Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 289-301.
  16. Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L. & Gale, J., 1993. "Learning to be Imperfect: The Ultimatum Game," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems 9325, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  17. Miller, John H. & Andreoni, James, 1991. "Can evolutionary dynamics explain free riding in experiments?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 9-15, May.
  18. Palfrey, Thomas R & Prisbrey, Jeffrey E, 1997. "Anomalous Behavior in Public Goods Experiments: How Much and Why?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 829-46, December.
  19. Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L & Thaler, Richard H, 1986. "Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages S285-300, October.
  20. Frank, Robert H, 1985. "The Demand for Unobservable and Other Nonpositional Goods," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 101-16, March.
  21. Hoffman, Elizabeth & McCabe, Kevin & Smith, Vernon L, 1996. "Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 653-60, June.
  22. Varian, Hal R, 1982. "The Nonparametric Approach to Demand Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 945-73, July.
  23. Isaac, R. Mark & Walker, James M. & Williams, Arlington W., 1994. "Group size and the voluntary provision of public goods : Experimental evidence utilizing large groups," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 1-36, May.
  24. Andreoni, J., 1993. "Cooperation in Public Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems 9309, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  25. Andreoni, James, 1988. "Why free ride? : Strategies and learning in public goods experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 291-304, December.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. David K Levine, 1997. "Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2047, David K. Levine.
  2. Gary E Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 1997. "A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1889, David K. Levine.
  3. Daniel Friedman & Nirvikar Singh, 2004. "Vengefulness Evolves in Small Groups," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 0412005, EconWPA.
  4. Rami Zwick & Xiao-Ping Chen, 1999. "What Price Fairness? A Bargaining Study," Experimental, EconWPA 9902002, EconWPA.
  5. Giuseppe Lopomo & Efe A Ok, 2004. "Bargaining, Interdependence and the Rationality of Fair Division," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000395, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. Claudia Keser & Frans A.A.M. van Winden, 2000. "Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute 00-011/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  7. Özgür Yýlmaz, 2012. "The Strategic Advantage of Inequality Averse Preferences," Bogazici Journal of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Bogazici University, Department of Economics, Bogazici University, Department of Economics, vol. 26(2), pages 83-91.
  8. Giovanni Immordino, 2003. "Fairness, NGO Activism and the Welfare of Less Developed Countries," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy 101, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 09 Dec 2007.

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