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Inequality Aversion in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Conflict Payoffs - A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis -

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  • Sven Fischer

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    Abstract

    Assuming inequality averse subjects as modeled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or in the ERC model by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) in ultimatum games with asymmetric conflict payoffs allows to make predictions especially concerning responder acceptance thresholds. These predictions are tested in a laboratory experiment eliciting proposer offers and respondent's acceptance thresholds using the strategy vector method. By and large both models make good predictions. However, they are unable to convincingly explain the observed selfishness on behalf of responders in ultimatum games favoring them in conflict. Overall, observed behavior gives rise to a context dependent interpretation of inequality aversion and to Knez and Camerer's 1995 observation that subjects form 'egocentric assessments of fairness'.

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    Paper provided by Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group in its series Papers on Strategic Interaction with number 2005-36.

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    Length: 36 pages
    Date of creation: Oct 2005
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    Handle: RePEc:esi:discus:2005-36

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    Cited by:
    1. Markus Pasche, 2008. "Zum Erklärungsgehalt der verhaltensorientierten Spieltheorie," Jena Research Papers in Business and Economics - Working and Discussion Papers 04/2008, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, School of Economics and Business Administration.

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