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The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations

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Huck, Steffen
Oechssler, Jorg

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-45GMF16-12/2/ce34801949e2ae7bd33336ce3ee344c0
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 28 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 13-24
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:28:y:1999:i:1:p:13-24

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  1. Samuelson, L. & Zhang, J., 1991. "Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games," Papers 9132, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
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  2. Bergin, James & Lipman, Barton L, 1996. "Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(4), pages 943-56, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 523-45, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. De Long, J Bradford & Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers & Robert J. Waldmann, 1990. "Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(4), pages 703-38, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. S. Huck & G. Kirchsteiger & J. Oechssler, . "Learning to Like What You Have -Explaining the Endowment Effect-," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 1997-38, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
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  6. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Bolton Gary E. & Zwick Rami, 1995. "Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 95-121, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-66, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Ritzberger, Klaus & Weibull, Jorgen W, 1995. "Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1371-99, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Harrison, Glenn W & McCabe, Kevin A, 1996. "Expectations and Fairness in a Simple Bargaining Experiment," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 303-27.
  12. Kirchsteiger, Georg, 1994. "The role of envy in ultimatum games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 373-389, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Prasnikar, Vesna & Roth, Alvin E, 1992. "Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(3), pages 865-88, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. R. Cressman, K.H. Schlag, 1995. "The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction," Discussion Paper Serie B 347, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Blume, Lawrence & Easley, David, 1992. "Evolution and market behavior," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 9-40, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Bolton, Gary E, 1991. "A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1096-136, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Nachbar, J H, 1990. ""Evolutionary" Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 59-89.
  18. Van Damme, Eric, 1994. "Evolutionary game theory," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 847-858, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Becker, Gary S, 1976. "Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: Economics and Sociobiology," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 817-26, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Noeldecke,Georg Samuelson,Larry, . "An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction," Discussion Paper Serie B 228, University of Bonn, Germany.
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  21. Bester, H. & Gueth, W., 1994. "Is Altruism Evolutionarily Stable ?," Discussion Paper 103, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  22. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Samuelson Larry, 1994. "Stochastic Stability in Games with Alternative Best Replies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 35-65, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Thaler, Richard H, 1988. "The Ultimatum Game," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 195-206, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. Johan Stennek, 2000. "The survival value of assuming others to be rational," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 147-163. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  26. Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 363-391, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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