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Loss of Commitment? An Evolutionary Analysis of Bagwell’s Example

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Author Info
Jörg Oechssler
Karl H Schlag

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 598.

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Date of creation: 14 May 1997
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:598

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kyle Bagwell, 1992. "Commitment and Observability in Games," Discussion Papers 1014, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  2. B. Adolph, . "Commitment, Trembling Hand Imperfection and Observability in Games," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 1996-84, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
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  1. Felix Várdy & John Morgan, 2005. "The Value of Commitment in Contests and Tournaments when Observation is Costly," Public Economics 0504005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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