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Imperfectly Observable Commitments in n-Player Games

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Author Info
Werner GÜTH
Georg KIRCHSTEIGER
Klaus RITZBERGER

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Vienna, Department of Economics in its series Vienna Economics Papers with number vie9507.

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Date of creation: Dec 1995
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Publication status: published in Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 23, No. 1, March 1998, 54-74
Handle: RePEc:vie:viennp:vie9507

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Web page: http://www.univie.ac.at/vwl

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  1. V. Bhaskar, 2005. "Commitment and Observability in an Economic Environment," Economics Discussion Papers 596, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Jorg Oechssler & Karl Schlag, 1997. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Bagwell's Example," Game Theory and Information 9704001, EconWPA, revised 11 Apr 1997. [Downloadable!]
  3. V. Bhaskar & Eric van Damme, 1998. "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Game Theory and Information 9809004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Felix Várdy & John Morgan, 2005. "The Value of Commitment in Contests and Tournaments when Observation is Costly," Public Economics 0504005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Johan Lagerlöf, 2000. "Policy-Motivated Candidates, Noisy Platforms, and Non-Robustness," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-17, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Werner Güth, 2002. "On the Inconsistency of Equilibrium Refinement," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 371-392, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. B. Adolph & E. Wolfstetter, . "Reputation and Imperfectly Observable Commitment: The Chain Store Paradox Revisited," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 1996-85, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
  8. Steffen Huck & Wieland Mueller, 1998. "Perfect versus imperfect observability---An experimental test of Bagwell's result," Experimental 9804001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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