Imperfectly Observable Commitments in n-Player Games
AbstractIn a two-stage extensive form game where followers can observe moves by leaders only with noise, pure subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the limiting game without noise may not survive arbitrarily small noise. Still, for generic games, there is always at least one subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game with no noise that is approximated by equilibrium outcomes of games with small noise. This, however, depends crucially on generic payoffs.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Vienna, Department of Economics in its series Vienna Economics Papers with number vie9507.
Date of creation: Dec 1995
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 23, No. 1, March 1998, 54-74
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Web page: http://www.univie.ac.at/vwl
Other versions of this item:
- Guth, Werner & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Ritzberger, Klaus, 1998. "Imperfectly Observable Commitments inn-Player Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 54-74, April.
- Gueth, Werner & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Ritzberger, Klaus, 1996. "Imperfectly Observable Commitments in n-Player Games," Economics Series 35, Institute for Advanced Studies.
- Georg Kirchsteiger & Werner Güth & Klaus Ritzberger, 1998. "Imperfectly observable commitments in n-player games," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5907, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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