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Games with Imperfectly Observable Commitment

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Author Info
van Damme, Eric
Hurkens, Sjaak

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-45N4T98-K/2/6b37e9fa01957104cde9f0e409c4ef76
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 21 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (October)
Pages: 282-308
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:21:y:1997:i:1-2:p:282-308

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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  1. Sven Fischer & Werner Güth & Wieland Müller & Andreas Stiehler, 2006. "From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 17-33, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. V. Bhaskar, 2005. "Commitment and Observability in an Economic Environment," Economics Discussion Papers 596, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Eilon Solan & Leeat Yariv, 1998. "Games with Espionage," Discussion Papers 1257, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  4. B. Adolph & E. Wolfstetter, . "Reputation and Imperfectly Observable Commitment: The Chain Store Paradox Revisited," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 1996-85, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
  5. James D. Dana, 2000. "Competition in Price and Availability when Availability is Unobservable," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1450, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Siegfried K. Berninghaus & Werner Güth, 2002. "NOW OR LATER? - An Analysis of the Timing of Threats in Bargaining," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-38, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  7. Wieland Müller & Yossi Spiegel & Werner Güth, . "Noisy leadership: An experimental approach," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-10, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Felix Várdy & John Morgan, 2005. "The Value of Commitment in Contests and Tournaments when Observation is Costly," Public Economics 0504005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Steffen Huck & Wieland Mueller, 1998. "Perfect versus imperfect observability---An experimental test of Bagwell's result," Experimental 9804001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Robert Ritz, 2005. "Strategic incentives for market share," Economics Series Working Papers 248, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Mitraille, Sébastien & Moreaux, Michel, 2007. "Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Hierarchy in Two-Period Cournot Oligopoly," IDEI Working Papers 428, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Poulsen, Anders, 2007. "Learning to Make Strategic Moves: Experimental Evidence," MPRA Paper 10927, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  13. B. Adolph, . "Commitment, Trembling Hand Imperfection and Observability in Games," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 1996-84, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
  14. Elmar Wolfstetter & Brigitte Adolph, 1997. "Chain Store Paradoxon," Microeconomics 9701005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  15. Jorg Oechssler & Karl Schlag, 1997. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Bagwell's Example," Game Theory and Information 9704001, EconWPA, revised 11 Apr 1997. [Downloadable!]
  16. V. Bhaskar & Eric van Damme, 1998. "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Game Theory and Information 9809004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  17. Anders Poulsen & Odile Poulsen, 2008. "A note on commitment when there are errors in communication," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(74), pages 1-8. [Downloadable!]
  18. B. Adolph, . "Monetary Policy under Imperfectly Observable Commitment: The Return of the Time Inconsistency Problem," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 1995-34, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
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