Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information

Contents:

Author Info

  • Atsushi Kajii
  • Stephen Morris

Abstract

A number of papers have shown that a strict Nash equilibrium action profile of a game may never be played if there is a small amount of incomplete information. The authors present a general approach to analyzing the robustness of equilibria to a small amount of incomplete information. A Nash equilibrium of a complete information game is said to be robust to incomplete information if every incomplete information game with payoffs almost always given by the complete information game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to the Nash equilibrium. The authors show that many games with strict equilibria have no robust equilibrium and examine why they get such different results from existing refinements. If a game has a unique correlated equilibrium, it is robust. A natural many-player many-action generalization of risk dominance is a sufficient condition for robustness.

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 65 (1997)
Issue (Month): 6 (November)
Pages: 1283-1310

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:65:y:1997:i:6:p:1283-1310

Contact details of provider:
Phone: 1 212 998 3820
Fax: 1 212 995 4487
Email:
Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/memb.asp?ref=0012-9682

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. E. Kohlberg & J.-F. Mertens, 1998. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 445, David K. Levine.
  2. Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January.
  3. Abraham Neyman, 1997. "Correlated Equilibrium and Potential Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 223-227.
  4. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 1990. "Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 243-267, December.
  5. T. Börgers, 2010. "Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge," Levine's Working Paper Archive 378, David K. Levine.
  6. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "Payoff Continuity in Incomplete Information Games," Discussion Papers 1193R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  7. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1989. "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 385-91, June.
  8. Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 1989. "Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 170-190, June.
  9. Levine, David & Kreps, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 1988. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," Scholarly Articles 3350444, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  10. Carlsson, H. & Van Dame, E., 1991. "Equilibrium Selection in Stag Hunt Games," Papers 9170, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  11. Carlsson, H. & Van Damme, E., 1990. "Global Games And Equilibrium Selection," Papers 9052, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  12. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
  13. Cotter, Kevin D., 1991. "Correlated equilibrium in games with type-dependent strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 48-68, June.
  14. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Correlated Equilibrium in Two-Person Zero-Sum Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(2), pages 515, March.
  15. S. Morris & R. Rob & H. Shin, 2010. "p-dominance and Belief Potential," Levine's Working Paper Archive 505, David K. Levine.
  16. Kajii, Atsushi & Morris, Stephen, 1997. "Commonp-Belief: The General Case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 73-82, January.
  17. Van Damme, E., 1991. "Equilibrium Selection in 2 x 2 Games," Papers 9108, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:65:y:1997:i:6:p:1283-1310. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.