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Correlated Equilibrium and Potential Games

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Author Info
Abraham Neyman (Institute of Mathematics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Givat Ram, Jerusalem 91904, Israel and Institute for Decision Sciences, SUNY Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY 11794, USA)

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Abstract

Any correlated equilibrium of a strategic game with bounded payoffs and convex strategy sets which has a smooth concave potential, is a mixture of pure strategy profiles which maximize the potential. If moreover, the strategy sets are compact and the potential is strictly concave, then the game has a unique correlated equilibrium.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 26 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 223-227
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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:2:p:223-227

Note: Received: July 1995 Revised version: August 1995
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  1. Michael Chwe, 2006. "Statistical Game Theory," Theory workshop papers 815595000000000004, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, . ""The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information*''," CARESS Working Papres 95-18, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Belief Free Incomplete Information Games," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001569, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Anat Bracha & Donald J. Brown, 2007. "Affective Decision Making: A Behavioral Theory of Choice," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1633, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  5. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001574, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Anat Bracha & Donald J Brown, 2007. "Affective Decision Making: a Behavioral Theory of Choice," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001676, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Morris, Stephen Morris & Takashi Ui, 2002. "Best Response Equivalence," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1377, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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