Best Response Equivalence
AbstractTwo games are best-response equivalent if they have the same best-response correspondence. We provide a characterization of when two games are best-response equivalent. The characterizations exploit a dual relationship between payoff differences and beliefs. Some "potential game" arguments (cf. Monderer and Shapley, 1996, Games. Econ. Behav. 14, 124-143) rely only on the property that potential games are best-response equivalent to identical interest games. Our results show that a large class of games are best-response equivalent to identical interest games, but are not potential games. Thus we show how some existing potential game arguments can be extended.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1377.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2002
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Games and Economic Behavior (2004), 49: 260-287
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Other versions of this item:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-GTH-2002-10-18 (Game Theory)
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