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Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria

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Author Info
smorris
Takashi Ui
Abstract

This paper introduces generalized potential functions of complete information games and studies the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information. A set of equilibria of a complete information game is robust if every incomplete information game where payoffs are almost always given by the complete information game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to some equilibrium in the set. First, this paper provides sufficient conditions for the robustness of sets of equilibria in terms of argmax sets of generalized potential functions. Next, it shows that the sufficient conditions generalize the existing sufficient conditions for the robustness of equilibria

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Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings with number 45.

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Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:nawm04:45

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Related research
Keywords: potential functions; equilibrium selection; robustness;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

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  1. Ui, Takashi, 2001. "Robust Equilibria of Potential Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1373-80, September.
  2. Hofbauer, Josef & Sorger, Gerhard, 1999. "Perfect Foresight and Equilibrium Selection in Symmetric Potential Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 1-23, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1283-1310, November.
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  4. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 1999. "Potential games: a purely ordinal approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 279-283, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Voorneveld, Mark, 2000. "Best-response potential games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 289-295, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Ui, Takashi, 2000. "A Shapley Value Representation of Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 121-135, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "Refinements and Social Order Beliefs: A Unified Survey," Discussion Papers 1197, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  8. Blume Lawrence E., 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 387-424, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Morris, Stephen Morris & Takashi Ui, 2002. "Best Response Equivalence," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1377, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Carlsson, H. & Van Damme, E., 1990. "Global Games And Equilibrium Selection," Papers 9052, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
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  11. David M. Frankel & Stephen Morris & Ady Pauzner, 2001. "Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1336, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-37, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "Potential, Value, and Consistency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 589-614, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Larry E. Blume, 1996. "Population Games," Working Papers 96-04-022, Santa Fe Institute.
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