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Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities

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  • Frankel, David M.
  • Morris, Stephen
  • Pauzner, Ady

Abstract

We study games with strategic complementarities, arbitrary numbers of players and actions, and slightly noisy payoff signals. We prove limit uniqueness: as the signal noise vanishes, the game has a unique strategy profile that survives iterative dominance. This generalizes a result of Carlsson and van Damme (1993) for two player, two action games. Te surviving profile, however, may depend on fine details of the structure of the noise. We provide sufficient conditions on payoffs for there to be noise-independent selection.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Iowa State University, Department of Economics in its series Staff General Research Papers with number 11920.

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Date of creation: 01 Jan 2003
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Publication status: Published in Journal of Economic Theory 2003,, pp. 1-44
Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:11920

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Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070
Phone: +1 515.294.6741
Fax: +1 515.294.0221
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Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
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References

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  1. Vives, X., 1988. "Nash Equilibrium With Strategic Complementarities," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 107-88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  2. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2000. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1275, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  3. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 1999. "Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1241, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  4. Carlsson, H. & Van Dame, E., 1991. "Equilibrium Selection in Stag Hunt Games," Papers, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research 9170, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  5. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September.
  6. Stephen Morris & Takashi Ui, 2003. "Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000325, David K. Levine.
  7. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1283-1310, November.
  8. S. Morris & R. Rob & H. Shin, 2010. "p-dominance and Belief Potential," Levine's Working Paper Archive 505, David K. Levine.
  9. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1998. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 587-97, June.
  10. Frankel, David M. & Burdzy, Krzysztof & Pauzner, Ady, 2001. "Fast Equilibrium Selection by Rational Players Living in a Changing World," Staff General Research Papers, Iowa State University, Department of Economics 11923, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  11. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1994. "Comparing Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 441-59, June.
  12. David Frankel & Ady Pauzner, 2000. "Resolving Indeterminacy In Dynamic Settings: The Role Of Shocks," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 115(1), pages 285-304, February.
  13. Giancarlo Corsetti & Amil Dasgupta & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2001. "Does one Soros make a difference?: a theory of currency crises with large and small traders," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library 25045, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  14. Akihiko Matsui & Kiminori Matsuyama, 1990. "An Approach to Equilibrium Selection," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 970, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  15. Athey, S., 1997. "Sigle Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 97-11, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  16. Van Damme, E., 1991. "Equilibrium Selection in 2 x 2 Games," Papers, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research 9108, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  17. Giancarlo Corsetti & Amil Dasgupta & Stephen Morris & Shin, Hyun, 2000. "Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1273, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  18. Ui, Takashi, 2001. "Robust Equilibria of Potential Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1373-80, September.
  19. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1989. "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 385-91, June.
  20. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
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