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A Theory of the Onset of Currency Attacks

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Author Info
Morris, S.
Shin, H.S.

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Abstract

The swiftness and devastating impact of recent financial crises have taken many market participants by surprise, and pose challenges for economists seeking a theory of the onset of a crisis. We propose such a theory based on two features. The actions of diverse economic actors which undermine the currency are mutually reinforcing, while the fragment nature of the media create small disparities in their information. In such circumstances, the beliefs of market participants can be tracked in the same way as the economic fundamentals, and an attach is triggered when the economic fundamentals deteriorate sufficiently to fall below the minimum level of market confidence necessary to support the currency. We give a characterization of such a minimum level of confidence.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford in its series Economics Papers with number 149.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:149

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Web page: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/

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Related research
Keywords: CURRENCIES MONETARY CRISIS

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Shin Hyun Song, 1993. "Logical Structure of Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 1-13, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Flood, Robert P & Garber, Peter M, 1984. "Gold Monetization and Gold Discipline," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(1), pages 90-107, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1283-1310, November.
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  4. Maurice Obstfeld, 1997. "Models of Currency Crises with Self-Fulfilling Features," NBER Working Papers 5285, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Flood, Robert P. & Garber, Peter M., 1984. "Collapsing exchange-rate regimes : Some linear examples," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 1-13, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1998. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 587-97, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1989. "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 385-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, . "Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-ordination: Recent Lessons from Game Theory," CARESS Working Papres 97-8, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Maurice Obstfeld, 1994. "The Logic of Currency Crises," NBER Working Papers 4640, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Maurice Obstfeld, 1986. "Rational and Self-Fulfilling Balance-of-Payments Crises," NBER Working Papers 1486, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Krugman, Paul, 1979. "A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(3), pages 311-25, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Salant, Stephen W & Henderson, Dale W, 1978. "Market Anticipations of Government Policies and the Price of Gold," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(4), pages 627-48, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 1989. "Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 170-190, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Edison, Hali J & Luangaram, Pongsak & Miller, Marcus, 1998. "Asset Bubbles, Domino Effects and 'Lifeboats': Elements of the East Asian Crisis," CEPR Discussion Papers 1866, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Steven Radelet & Jeffrey Sachs, 1998. "The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis," NBER Working Papers 6680, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Jakub Steiner, 2006. "Coordination of Mobile Labor," ESE Discussion Papers 152, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Gerald Pech & Bernhard Neumaerker, 2002. "The Role of Beliefs for the Sustainability of the Fiscal Constitution," CRIEFF Discussion Papers 0213, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm. [Downloadable!]
  3. Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2006. "Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination," Discussion Papers 158, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Larry Karp, 2000. "Fundamentals versus Beliefs under Almost Common Knowledge," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series 871R, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Mundaca, Gabriela, 2003. "Optimal bailout during currency and financial crises: A sequential game analysis," Memorandum 27/2002, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Fernando Broner, 2003. "Discrete Devaluations and Multiple Equilibria in a First Generation Model of Currency Crises," Economics Working Papers 839, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2007. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Christophe Chamley, 2002. "Dynamic Speculative Attacks," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-119, Boston University - Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Mundaca, B. Gabriela, 2002. "Moral Hazard Effects of Bailing out under Asymmetric Information," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  9. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 1999. "Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1241, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Christian Hellwig, 2004. "Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity and Timing of Attacks (August 2006, with George-Marios Angeletos and Alessandro Pavan)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 279, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. George-Marios Angeletos & Christian Hellwig & Alessandro Pavan, 2004. "Information Dynamics and Equilibrium Multiplicity in Global Games of Regime Change," NBER Working Papers 11017, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Mundaca,B.G. & Strand,J., 1999. "Speculative attacks in the exchange market with a band policy : a sequential game analysis," Memorandum 01/1999, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Femminis, Gianluca, 2002. "Currency Attacks with Multiple Equilibria and Imperfect Information: The Role of Wage-setters," CEPR Discussion Papers 3291, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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