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Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games

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Author Info
Stephen Morris () (Yale University, Cowles Foundation)
Hyun Song Shin () (University of London, London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE), Department of Accounting and Finance)

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Abstract

Incomplete information games, local interaction games and random matching games are all special cases of a general class of interaction games (Morris (1997)). In this paper, we use this equivalence to present a unified treatment of arguments generating uniqueness in games with strategic complementarities by introducing heterogeneity in these different settings. We also report on the relation between local and global heterogeneity, on the role of strategic multipliers and on purification in the three types of interaction game.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Yale School of Management in its series Yale School of Management Working Papers with number ysm341.

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Date of creation: 28 Jul 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm341

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Related research
Keywords: Heterogeneity; Uniqueness; Global Games;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Hellwig, Christian, 2002. "Public Information, Private Information, and the Multiplicity of Equilibria in Coordination Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 191-222, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Lawrence Blume, 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Best-Response Strategy Revision," Game Theory and Information 9307001, EconWPA, revised 26 Jan 1994. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Arms Races and Negotiations," Economics Working Papers 0007, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Hyun Song Shin & Stephen Morris, 2001. "Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt," FMG Discussion Papers dp373, Financial Markets Group. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Dilip Abreu & Markus K. Brunnermeier, 2003. "Bubbles and Crashes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 173-204, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Burdzy, Krzysztof & Frankel, David M & Pauzner, Ady, 2001. "Fast Equilibrium Selection by Rational Players Living in a Changing World," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(1), pages 163-89, January.
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  7. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-71, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Antonio Ciccone & James Costain, 2001. "On Payoff Heterogeneity in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Economics Working Papers 546, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Feb 2002. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Vives, Xavier, 1990. "Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 305-321. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Frankel, David M. & Morris, Stephen & Pauzner, Ady, 2004. "Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities," Staff General Research Papers 11920, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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  11. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Adsera, Alicia & Ray, Debraj, 1998. " History and Coordination Failure," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 267-76, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Shin, Hyun Song & Morris, Stephen, 2000. "Welfare effects of public information," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2000,07, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  14. Herrendorf, Berthold & Valentinyi, Akos & Waldmann, Robert, 2000. "Ruling Out Multiplicity and Indeterminacy: The Role of Heterogeneity," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(2), pages 295-307, April.
  15. Edward L. Glaeser & Jose Scheinkman, 2000. "Non-Market Interactions," NBER Working Papers 8053, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2000. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1275, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  17. David Frankel & Ady Pauzner, 2000. "Resolving Indeterminacy In Dynamic Settings: The Role Of Shocks," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(1), pages 285-304, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2006. "Endogenous Public Signals and Coordination," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001309, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. In-Ho Lee & Robin Mason, 2002. "Coordination in the static and the dynamic," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391749000000000503, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  3. Paul A. Grout & Sebastien Mitraille & Silvia Sonderegger, 2008. "The Costs and Benefits of "Strangers": Why Mixed Communities Are Better," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 08/191, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
  4. Rossella Argenziano, 2007. "Differentiated Networks: Equilibrium and Efficiency," Economics Discussion Papers 638, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Xue, J., 2006. "Collective Behavior with Endogenous Thresholds," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0613, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  6. Mathevet, Laurent, . "A contraction principle for finite global games," Working Papers 1243, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  7. Ulrich Horst & Jos´e A. Scheinkman, 2006. "A Limit Theorem for Systems of Social Interactions," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000177, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Jackson, Matthew O. & Yariv, Leeat, 2006. "Diffusion of Behavior and Equilibrium Properties in Network Games," Working Papers 1264, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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