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Arms Races and Negotiations

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Sandeep Baliga
Tomas Sjostrom

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Paper provided by www.najecon.org in its series NajEcon Working Paper Reviews with number 391749000000000005.

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Date of creation: 06 Dec 2001
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Handle: RePEc:cla:najeco:391749000000000005

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  1. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 236-260, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1998. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 587-97, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1989. "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 385-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Matthews, Steven A. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1989. "Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 238-263, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Sandeep Baliga & Stephen Morris, 2000. "Coordination, Spillovers, and Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers 1301, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Calvert, Randall L., 1992. "A battle-of-the-sexes game with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 347-372, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Schwarz, Michael & Sonin, Konstantin, 2005. "A Theory of Brinkmanship, Conflicts, and Commitments," CEPR Discussion Papers 5075, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Kaushik Basu, 2007. "Identity and altruism: The Moral basis of prosperity and oppression," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 08-08, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India. [Downloadable!]
  3. Brendan O'Flaherty & Rajiv Sethi, 2007. "Peaceable kingdoms and war zones: Pre-emption, ballistics and murder in Newark," Discussion Papers 0708-02, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2000. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1275R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Aug 2001. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Kaushik Basu, 2005. "Racial conflict and the malignancy of identity," Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 221-241, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002. "Long Cheap Talk," Discussion Paper Series dp284, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002. [Downloadable!]
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    • Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003. "Long Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2007. "Strategic Information Transmission through the Media," MPRA Paper 5556, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2007. [Downloadable!]
  8. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2003. "Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1402, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Matthew O. Jackson & Massimo Morelli, 2007. "Strategic Militarization, Deterrence and Wars," Discussion Papers 0708-04, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Shyh-fang Ueng, 2005. "A theory of efficient coexistence," International Economic Journal, Korean International Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 397-416, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Murali Agastya & Flavio Menezes & Kunal Sengupta, 2005. "Cheap talk, Efficiency and Egalitarian Cost Sharing In Joint Projects," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000551, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Xue, J., 2006. "Collective Behavior with Endogenous Thresholds," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0613, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  13. Sylvain Chassang & Gerard Padro i Miquel, 2008. "Conflict and Deterrence under Strategic Risk," NBER Working Papers 13964, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Helmut Bester & Karl Wärneryd, 2006. "Conflict and the Social Contract," Discussion Papers 94, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Dan Levin & James Peck, 2005. "Investment Dynamics with Common and Private Values," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000607, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjöström, 2006. "Strategic Ambiguity and Arms Proliferation," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001247, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  17. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2004. "Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Privately Known Budget Constraints," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000373, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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