Adaptive Dynamics with Payoff Heterogeneity
AbstractA finite population of agents playing a 2 x 2 symmetric game evolves by adaptive best response. The assumption that players make mistakes is dropped in favor of one where players differ, via payoff heterogeneity. Arbitrary mutations are thus replaced with an economically justified specification. The depth as well as the width of basins of attraction is important when determining long-run behaviour. With vanishing noise and balanced payoff variances, the risk dominant equilibrium is selected. Unbalanced variances may result in the selection of other equilibra, including the payoff dominant. The ergodic extremer correspond exactly to the Bayesian Nash equilibria of the underlying trembled stage game. This enables an analysis of the ergodic distribution for non-vanishing nise and larger populations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution in its series ELSE working papers with number 001.
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Adaptive dynamics; Payoff heterogeniety; Evolution; Generalised risk dominance;
Other versions of this item:
- Myatt, D-P & Wallace, C, 1997. "Adaptive Dynamics with Payoff Heterogeneity," Economics Papers 130, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- David P Myatt & Chris Wallace, . "Adaptive dynamics with payoff heterogeneit," Economics Papers W31., Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
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- Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2003.
"Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1402, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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