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Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games

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Author Info
Stephen Morris (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)
Hyun Song Shin (London School of Economics)

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Abstract

Incomplete information games, local interaction games and random matching games are all special cases of a general class of interaction games (Morris (1997)). In this paper, we use this equivalence to present a unified treatment of arguments generating uniqueness in games with strategic complementarities by introducing heterogeneity in these different settings. We also report on the relation between local and global heterogeneity, on the role of strategic multipliers and on purification in the three types of interaction game.

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File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d14a/d1402.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Cowles Foundation, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1402.

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Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2003
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in The Economy as an Evolving Complex System III, ed. by L. Blume and S. Durlauf, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 207-242
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1402

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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

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Related research
Keywords: Heterogeneity Uniqueness Global games

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Hellwig, Christian, 2002. "Public Information, Private Information, and the Multiplicity of Equilibria in Coordination Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 191-222, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2000. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1275R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Aug 2001. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Lawrence Blume, 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Best-Response Strategy Revision," Game Theory and Information 9307001, EconWPA, revised 26 Jan 1994. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Arms Races and Negotiations," Economics Working Papers 0007, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Hyun Song Shin & Stephen Morris, 2001. "Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt," FMG Discussion Papers dp373, Financial Markets Group. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Dilip Abreu & Markus K. Brunnermeier, 2003. "Bubbles and Crashes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 173-204, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Burdzy, Krzysztof & Frankel, David M & Pauzner, Ady, 2001. "Fast Equilibrium Selection by Rational Players Living in a Changing World," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(1), pages 163-89, January.
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  8. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-71, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Antonio Ciccone & James Costain, 2001. "On Payoff Heterogeneity in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Economics Working Papers 546, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Feb 2002. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Vives, Xavier, 1990. "Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 305-321. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Frankel, David M. & Morris, Stephen & Pauzner, Ady, 2004. "Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities," Staff General Research Papers 11920, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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  12. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Adsera, Alicia & Ray, Debraj, 1998. " History and Coordination Failure," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 267-76, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Balinga, Sandeep & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2001. "Arms Races and Negotiations," Working Papers 3-01-2, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  15. Edward L. Glaeser & Jose Scheinkman, 2000. "Non-Market Interactions," NBER Working Papers 8053, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. David Frankel & Ady Pauzner, 2000. "Resolving Indeterminacy In Dynamic Settings: The Role Of Shocks," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(1), pages 285-304, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2006. "Endogenous Public Signals and Coordination," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001309, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Rossella Argenziano, 2007. "Differentiated Networks: Equilibrium and Efficiency," Economics Discussion Papers 638, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Xue, J., 2006. "Collective Behavior with Endogenous Thresholds," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0613, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  4. In-Ho Lee & Robin Mason, 2002. "Coordination in the static and the dynamic," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391749000000000503, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Mathevet, Laurent, . "A contraction principle for finite global games," Working Papers 1243, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  6. Ulrich Horst & Jos´e A. Scheinkman, 2006. "A Limit Theorem for Systems of Social Interactions," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000177, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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