Collective Behavior with Endogenous Thresholds

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Collective Behavior with Endogenous Thresholds

Author Info

Xue, J.

Abstract

We endogenize the threshold points in Granovetter’s threshold model of collective behavior (Granovetter 1978). We do this in a simple model that combines strategic complementarity and private information in a dynamic setup with endogenous order of moves. Looking at Granovetter’s model in the strategic context allows us to highlight the sensitivity of collective outcomes to the timing of the games and the reversibility of the actions, and to emphasize an extra incentive for people to follow other people: to encourage more people to follow them.

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Paper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 0613.

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Length: 37
Date of creation: Feb 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0613

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2006-02-19 (All new papers)
NEP-GTH-2006-02-19 (Game Theory)

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Other versions:
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Jianbo Zhang, 1997. "Strategic Delay and the Onset of Investment Cascades," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(1), pages 188-205, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Other versions:
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