Adaptive dynamics with payoff heterogeneit
AbstractA finite population of agents playing a 2 x 2 symmetric game evolves by adaptive best response. The assumption that players make mistakes is dropped in favor of one where players differ, via payoff heterogeneity. Arbitrary mutations are thus replaced with an economically justified specification. The depth as well as the width of basins of attraction is important when determining long-run behaviour. With vanishing noise and balanced payoff variances, the risk dominant equilibrium is selected. Unbalanced variances may result in the selection of other equilibra, including the payoff dominant. The ergodic extremer correspond exactly to the Bayesian Nash equilibria of the underlying trembled stage game. This enables an analysis of the ergodic distribution for non-vanishing nise and larger populations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford in its series Economics Papers with number W31..
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Web page: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/
Other versions of this item:
- Myatt, D-P & Wallace, C, 1997. "Adaptive Dynamics with Payoff Heterogeneity," Economics Papers, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford 130, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- David P. Myatt & Chris Wallace, . "Adaptive Dynamics with Payoff Heterogeneity," ELSE working papers, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution 001, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
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- Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2004.
"Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games,"
Yale School of Management Working Papers, Yale School of Management
ysm341, Yale School of Management.
- Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2003. "Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1402, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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