Adaptive Dynamics with Payoff Heterogeneity
AbstractA finite population of agents playing a 2 x 2 summetric game evolves vy adaptive best response. The assumption that players make mistakes is dropped in favour of one where players differ, via payoff heterogeneity.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford in its series Economics Papers with number 130.
Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/
Other versions of this item:
- David P Myatt & Chris Wallace, . "Adaptive dynamics with payoff heterogeneit," Economics Papers, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford W31., Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- David P. Myatt & Chris Wallace, . "Adaptive Dynamics with Payoff Heterogeneity," ELSE working papers, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution 001, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
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- Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2003.
"Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
1402, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2004. "Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games," Yale School of Management Working Papers, Yale School of Management ysm341, Yale School of Management.
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