Buying Decision Coordination and Monopoly Pricing of Network Goods

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Buying Decision Coordination and Monopoly Pricing of Network Goods

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Sääskilahti, Pekka

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Pekka Sääskilahti

Abstract

We analyse how consumer heterogeneity affects buying behaviour and the monopoly pricing of a network good and its usage. Under perfect information, sufficiently high heterogeneity yields a unique equilibrium, and the unit price is increasing in heterogeneity. Under incomplete information, we have a global game. The unit price is independent of heterogeneity, and it tends to be higher than the perfect information price, because the monopoly biases its tariff structure to incorporate the uncertainty over usage revenues. Under incomplete information, profits are decreasing in uncertainty. Consumer surplus increases in uncertainty, only if the level of uncertainty is high initially.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 5106.

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Date of creation: 27 Mar 2006
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:5106

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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