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Potential games: a purely ordinal approach

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Author Info
Kukushkin, Nikolai S.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 64 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 279-283
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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:64:y:1999:i:3:p:279-283

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  1. Stephen Morris & Takashi Ui, 2003. "Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000325, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2008. "Acyclicity of improvements in finite game forms," MPRA Paper 11802, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. Jacques Durieu & Hans Haller & Nicolas Querou & Philippe Solal, 2007. "Ordinal Games," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 07/74, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
  4. Nikolai S Kukushkin, 2004. "'Strategic supplements' in games with polylinear interactions," Game Theory and Information 0411008, EconWPA, revised 28 Feb 2005. [Downloadable!]
  5. smorris & Takashi Ui, 2004. "Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 45, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  6. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2008. "Best response adaptation under dominance solvability," MPRA Paper 4108, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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