1. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Robert J. Weber, 1977. "Probabilistic Values for Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 471R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Pradeep Dubey & Robert J. Weber, 1977. "Probabilistic Values for Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 471, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
3. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1983. "On Weighted Shapley Values," Discussion Papers 602, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
4. Stef Tijs & Anne van den Nouweland & Bhaskar Dutta, 1998. "Link formation in cooperative situations," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 245-256. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Dutta, B. & Nouweland, A. van den & Tijs, S., 1995. "Link Formation in Cooperative Situations," Discussion Paper 35, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
5. Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Conference Structures and Fair Allocation Rules," Discussion Papers 363, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
6. Roger B. Myerson, 1976. "Graphs and Cooperation in Games," Discussion Papers 246, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
7. Qin, Cheng-Zhong, 1996. "Endogenous Formation of Cooperation Structures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 218-226, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "Potential, Value, and Consistency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 589-614, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
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1. Rod Garratt & Cheng-Zhong Qin, 2003. "On potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(12), pages 1-11. [Downloadable!]
2. Arnold, Tone & Wooders, Myrna, 2002. "Dynamic Club Formation With Coordination," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 640, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Tone Arnold & Myrna Wooders, 2005. "Dynamic Club Formation with Coordination," Working Papers 0522, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
3. Slikker, M., 1999. "Coalition formation and potential games," Discussion Paper 83, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Slikker, Marco, 2001. "Coalition Formation and Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 436-448, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Anne van den Nouweland, 2004. "The Formation of Communication Networks in Cooperative Games," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2004-2, University of Oregon Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
5. Rod Garratt & Cheng-Zhong Qin & James E. Parco & Amnon Rapoport, 2004. "Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation," Working Papers 2004.82, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Rod Garratt & Cheng-Zhong Qin, . "Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 11-00, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
   • Rod Garratt & Cheng-Zhong Qin, 2000. "Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series wp11-00, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
   • Rod Garratt & James E. Parco & Cheng-Zhong Qin & Amnon Rapoport, 2005. "Potential Maximization And Coalition Government Formation," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(04), pages 407-429. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Slikker, M. & Nouweland, A. van den, 1997. "A one-stage model of link formation and payoff division," Discussion Paper 23, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Slikker, Marco & van den Nouweland, Anne, 2001. "A One-Stage Model of Link Formation and Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 153-175, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Rod Garratt & Cheng-Zhong Qin, 2003. "On cooperation structures resulting from simultaneous proposals," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(5), pages 1-9. [Downloadable!]
8. Frank Page & Myrna Wooders, 2007. "Strategic Basins of Attraction, the Path Dominance Core, and Network Formation Games," Caepr Working Papers 2007-020, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Frank H. Page, Jr. & Myrna H. Wooders, 2006. "Strategic Basins of Attraction, the Path Dominance Core, and Network Formation Games," Working Papers 0614, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
9. Gilles, R.P. & Sarangi, S., 2004. "Social network formation with consent," Discussion Paper 70, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
10. Slikker, M. & Gilles, R. & Norde, H. & Tijs, S., 2000. "Directed communication networks," Discussion Paper 84, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
11. Filippo VERGARA CAFFARELLI, 2004. "Non-Cooperative Network Formation with Network Maintenance Costs," Economics Working Papers ECO2004/18, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]