On continuous ordinal potential games
AbstractIf the preferences of the players in a strategic game satisfy certain continuity conditions, then the acyclicity of individual improvements implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, starting from any strategy profile, an arbitrary neighborhood of the set of Nash equilibria can be reached after a finite number of individual improvements.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 20713.
Date of creation: 15 Feb 2010
Date of revision:
potential game; compact-continuous game; finite improvement property;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-02-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2010-02-27 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2010-02-27 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
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