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Best response dynamics in finite games with additive aggregation

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  • Kukushkin, Nikolai S.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 48 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 94-110

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:48:y:2004:i:1:p:94-110

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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References

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  1. Vives, Xavier, 1990. "Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 305-321.
  2. Novshek, William., 1984. "On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium," Working Papers 517, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  3. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
  4. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
  5. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 1994. "A fixed-point theorem for decreasing mappings," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 23-26, September.
  6. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-77, November.
  7. Milgrom, P. & Shannon, C., 1991. "Monotone Comparative Statics," Papers 11, Stanford - Institute for Thoretical Economics.
  8. Friedman, James W. & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2001. "Learning in Games by Random Sampling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 55-84, May.
  9. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Fictitious Play Property for Games with Identical Interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 258-265, January.
  10. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
  11. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 1999. "Potential games: a purely ordinal approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 279-283, September.
  12. Voorneveld, Mark, 2000. "Best-response potential games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 289-295, March.
  13. Rand, David, 1978. "Exotic phenomena in games and duopoly models," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 173-184, September.
  14. Holzman, Ron & Law-Yone, Nissan, 1997. "Strong Equilibrium in Congestion Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 85-101, October.
  15. Milchtaich, Igal, 1996. "Congestion Games with Player-Specific Payoff Functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 111-124, March.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Martin Jensen, 2010. "Aggregative games and best-reply potentials," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 45-66, April.
  2. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2013. "Approximate Nash equilibrium under the single crossing conditions," MPRA Paper 44320, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Nikolai Kukushkin, 2011. "Nash equilibrium in compact-continuous games with a potential," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 387-392, May.
  4. Galbiati, Marco & Soramaki, Kimmo, 2008. "An agent-based model of payment systems," Bank of England working papers 352, Bank of England.
  5. Hannu Salonen, 2013. "Utilitarian Preferences and Potential Games," Discussion Papers 85, Aboa Centre for Economics.
  6. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2012. "Cournot tatonnement and potentials," MPRA Paper 43188, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Martimort, David & Stole, Lars, 2011. "Aggregate Representations of Aggregate Games," MPRA Paper 32871, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Moulin, Hervé, 2010. "An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 107-131, September.
  9. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2007. "Best response adaptation under dominance solvability," MPRA Paper 4108, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Dindos, Martin & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2006. "Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 261-292, February.
  11. Uno, Hiroshi, 2011. "Strategic complementarities and nested potential games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 728-732.
  12. Nikolai S. Kukushkin, 2007. "Shapley's "2 by 2" theorem for game forms," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(33), pages 1-5.
  13. Dubey, Pradeep & Haimanko, Ori & Zapechelnyuk, Andriy, 2006. "Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 77-94, January.
  14. Martimort, David & Stole, Lars, 2012. "Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 753-772.
  15. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2009. "On the existence of monotone selections," MPRA Paper 14451, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  16. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2010. "On continuous ordinal potential games," MPRA Paper 20713, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. UNO, Hiroshi, 2011. "Nested potentials and robust equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers 2011009, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  18. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2007:i:33:p:1-5 is not listed on IDEAS
  19. Nikolai S Kukushkin, 2004. "'Strategic supplements' in games with polylinear interactions," Game Theory and Information 0411008, EconWPA, revised 28 Feb 2005.

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