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A characterization of strategic complementarities

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Author Info
Federico Echenique

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Abstract

I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some quali cations, games with a unique equilibrium have complementarities if and only if Cournot best-response dynamics has no cycles; and that all games with multiple equi- libria have complementarities. As applications of my results, I show: 1. That generic 2X2 games either have no pure-strategy equilibria, or have complementarities. 2. That generic two-player nite ordinal potential games have complementarities.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics - dECON in its series Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) with number 0501.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2001
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Handle: RePEc:ude:wpaper:0501

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Related research
Keywords: Strategic complementarities; supermodular games; non-standard analysis; Cournot best-response dynamics; potential games.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-77, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Rabah Amir & Val E. Lambson, 1998. "On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets," CIE Discussion Papers 1998-06, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
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  3. Lippman, Steven A. & Mamer, John W. & McCardle, Kevin F., 1987. "Comparative statics in non-cooperative games via transfinitely iterated play," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 288-303, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2000. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1275, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Zhou Lin, 1994. "The Set of Nash Equilibria of a Supermodular Game Is a Complete Lattice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 295-300, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Milgrom, Paul & Shannon, Chris, 1994. "Monotone Comparative Statics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(1), pages 157-80, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Villas-Boas, J. Miguel, 1997. "Comparative Statics of Fixed Points," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 183-198, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Vives, Xavier, 1990. "Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 305-321. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Amir, Rabah, 1996. "Cournot Oligopoly and the Theory of Supermodular Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 132-148, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Federico Echenique., 2000. "Comparative Statics by Adaptive Dynamics and The Correspondence Principle," Economics Working Papers E00-273, University of California at Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Echenique, Federico & Sabarwal, Tarun, 2003. "Strong comparative statics of equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 307-314, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Rabah Amir & Filomena Garcia & Malgorzata Knauff, 2006. "Endogenous Heterogeneity in Strategic Models: Symmetry-breaking via Strategic Substitutes and Nonconcavities," Working Papers 2006/29, Department of Economics at the School of Economics and Management (ISEG), Technical University of Lisbon.. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. AMIR, Rabah, 2004. "Ordinal versus cardinal complementarity : the case of cournot oligopoly," CORE Discussion Papers 2004036, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. AMIR, Rabah, 2003. "Supermodularity and complementarity in ecnomics: an elementary survey," CORE Discussion Papers 2003104, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. TESORIERE, Antonio, 2005. "Endogenous R&D symmetry in linear duopoly with one-way spillovers," CORE Discussion Papers 2005045, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
  5. Mathevet, Laurent, 2007. "Supermodular Bayesian implementation: Learning and incentive design," Working Papers 1265, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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