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Abstract

In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria--equilibria that are not in pure strategies--are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/0303/0303003.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0303003.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 19 Mar 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0303003

Note: 24 pages, Acrobat .pdf
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://128.118.178.162

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Find related papers by JEL classification:

• C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
• C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2003-03-25 (All new papers)
• NEP-GTH-2003-03-25 (Game Theory)
• NEP-IND-2003-03-25 (Industrial Organization)

References

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1. Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps, 2010. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 415, David K. Levine.
   
   • Fudenberg Drew & Kreps David M., 1993. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 320-367, July.
   • Fudenberg, D. & Kreps, D.M., 1992. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Working papers 92-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
2. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2222, David K. Levine.
   
   • Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
3. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414.
4. Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 2000. "Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 84-115, January.
   
   • Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 1998. "Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1817, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
5. Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009. "A Course in Game Theory," Levine's Bibliography 814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
   
   • Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401.
6. Benaim, Michel & Hirsch, Morris W., 1999. "Mixed Equilibria and Dynamical Systems Arising from Fictitious Play in Perturbed Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 36-72, October.
7. Paul R. Milgrom, 1979. "Good Nevs and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Discussion Papers 407R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
   
   • Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn.

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Citations

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Cited by:

1. Rabah Amir & Filomena Garcia & Malgorzata Knauff, 2006. "Endogenous Heterogeneity in Strategic Models: Symmetry-breaking via Strategic Substitutes and Nonconcavities," Working Papers 2006/29, Department of Economics at the School of Economics and Management (ISEG), Technical University of Lisbon..
   
   • AMIR, Rabah & GARCIA, Filomena & KNAUFF, Malgorzata, 2006. "Endogenous heterogeneity in strategic models: symmetry-breaking via strategic substitutes and nonconcavities," CORE Discussion Papers 2006008, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
2. Echenique, Federico, 2002. "A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities," Working Papers 1142, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
   
   • Echenique, Federico, 2004. "A characterization of strategic complementarities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 325-347, February.
   • Echenique, Federico, 2001. "A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt5w13s4z2, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
   • Federico Echenique, 2001. "A characterization of strategic complementarities," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0501, Department of Economics - dECON.
   • Federico Echenique., 2001. "A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities," Economics Working Papers E01-299, University of California at Berkeley.
   • Federico Echenique, 2001. "A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities," GE, Growth, Math methods 0103001, EconWPA.
3. Hofbauer, Josef & Hopkins, Ed, 2005. "Learning in perturbed asymmetric games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 133-152, July.
   
   • Josef Hofbauer & Ed Hopkins, 2004. "Learning in Perturbed Asymmetric Games," ESE Discussion Papers 53, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
4. Amir, Rabah & Halmenschlager, Christine & Jin, Jim, 2011. "R&D-induced industry polarization and shake-outs," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 386-398, July.
   
   • Amir R. & Halmenschlager C., 2008. "R&D-Induced Industry Polarization and Shakeouts," Working Papers ERMES 0802, ERMES, University Paris 2.
5. AMIR, Rabah, 2003. "Supermodularity and complementarity in ecnomics: an elementary survey," CORE Discussion Papers 2003104, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
   
   • Rabah Amir, 2005. "Supermodularity and Complementarity in Economics: An Elementary Survey," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 636-660, January.
6. Echenique, Federico & Edlin, Aaron S., 2004. "Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt1ht651hk, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
   
   • Echenique, Federico & Edlin, Aaron, 2004. "Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 61-79, September.

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