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Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complementarities

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Author Info
Federico Echenique (UC Berkeley and Universidad de la Republica)

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Abstract

The literature on games of strategic complementarities (GSC) has focused on pure strategies. I introduce mixed strategies and show that, when strategy spaces are one-dimensional, the complementarities framework extends to mixed strategies ordered by first-order stochastic dominance. In particular, the mixed extension of a GSC is a GSC, the full set of equilibria is a complete lattice and the extremal equilibria (smallest and largest) are in pure strategies. The framework does not extend when strategy spaces are multi-dimensional. I also update learning results for GSC using stochastic fictitious play.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0004006.

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Date of creation: 09 Oct 2000
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0004006

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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  1. Sunanda Roy & Tarun Sabarwal, 2008. "On the (non-)lattice structure of the equilibrium set in games with strategic substitutes," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 161-169, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Federico Echenique & Aaron Edlin, 2002. "Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1037, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
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