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Learning in Bayesian Games with Binary Actions

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  • Alan Beggs

Abstract

This paper considers a simple adaptive learning rule in Bayesian games where players employ threshold strategies. Global convergence results are given for supermodular games and potentital games.

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File URL: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/materials/working_papers/paper232.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 232.

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Date of creation: 01 Apr 2005
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Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:232

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Keywords: Bayesian Games; Learning; Binary Actions; Passive Stochastic Approximation;

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References

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  1. Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 2001. "Inductive Inference: An Axiomatic Approach," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1339, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  2. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
  3. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2002. "Learning to Play Bayesian Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000151, David K. Levine.
  4. Carlsson, H. & Van Damme, E., 1990. "Global Games And Equilibrium Selection," Papers, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research 9052, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  5. Rosemarie Nagel & Antonio Cabrales & Roc Armenter, 2002. "Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 601, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  6. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2000. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1275R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Aug 2001.
  7. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-77, November.
  8. Hardle, W., 1992. "Applied Nonparametric Methods," Papers, Catholique de Louvain - Institut de statistique 9204, Catholique de Louvain - Institut de statistique.
  9. Athey, Susan, 2001. "Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 861-89, July.
  10. Tsybakov,A.B., 1988. "Passive stochastic approximation," Discussion Paper Serie A, University of Bonn, Germany 207, University of Bonn, Germany.
  11. Oliver LINTON, . "Applied nonparametric methods," Statistic und Oekonometrie, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin 9312, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
  12. Benaim, Michel & Hirsch, Morris W., 1999. "Mixed Equilibria and Dynamical Systems Arising from Fictitious Play in Perturbed Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 36-72, October.
  13. Frank Heinemann & Rosemarie Nagel & Peter Ockenfels, 2004. "The Theory of Global Games on Test: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 72(5), pages 1583-1599, 09.
  14. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2222, David K. Levine.
  15. Selten, Reinhard & Joachim Buchta, 1994. "Experimental Sealed Bid First Price Auctions with Directly Observed Bid Functions," Discussion Paper Serie B, University of Bonn, Germany 270, University of Bonn, Germany.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Christoph March, 2011. "Adaptive social learning," PSE Working Papers halshs-00572528, HAL.
  2. Berardi, Michele, 2012. "Strategic interactions, incomplete information and learning," MPRA Paper 38651, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Alan Beggs & A.W. Beggs, 2011. "Regularity and Stability in Monotone Bayesian Games," Economics Series Working Papers 587, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  4. Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2007. "Learning by Similarity in Coordination Problems," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp324, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
  5. Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2006. "Contagion through Learning," ESE Discussion Papers, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh 151, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, revised 10 Aug 2007.

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