Many experimental studies implement two versions of one game for which agents’ behavior is fundamentally different even though the Nash prediction is the same. This paper provides a novel explanation of such findings. Starting from the observation that many of the games under consideration satisfy the strategic-complementarity property, I obtain predictions for the direction of adjustment in response to parameter changes which do not require calculation of the equilibrium. I show that these predictions explain the experimental evidence very well. Further, I provide a behavioral justification of the approach, and I explore the relation to alternative explanations based on equilibrium selection theories and the quantal response equilibrium.
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Paper provided by University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute in its series Working Papers with number
0601.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Stefan Boes & Markus Lipp & Rainer Winkelmann, 2005.
"Money Illusion Under Test,"
Working Papers
0514, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute.
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Other versions:
Boes, Stefan & Lipp, Markus & Winkelmann, Rainer, 2007.
"Money illusion under test,"
Economics Letters,
Elsevier, vol. 94(3), pages 332-337, March.
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