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Abstract

We investigate the stability of mixed strategy equilibria in 2 person (bimatrix) games under perturbed best response dynamics. A mixed equilibrium is asymptotically stable under all such dynamics if and only if the game is linearly equivalent to a zero sum game. In this case, the mixed equilibrium is also globally asymptotically stable. Global convergence to the set of perturbed equilibria is shown also for (rescaled) partnership games (also know as games of identical interest). Some applications of these result to stochastic learning models are given.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 52 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 133-152

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:52:y:2005:i:1:p:133-152

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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Find related papers by JEL classification:

• C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
• D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information

References

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