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On the Convergence of Fictitious Play

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Author Info

  • Vijay Krishna
  • Tomas Sjostrom

Abstract

We study the continuous time Brown-Robinson fictitious play process f or non-zero sum games. We show that, in general, fictitious play cannot converg e cyclically to a mixed strategy equilibrium in which both players use more tha n two pure strategies.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Harvard - Institute of Economic Research in its series Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers with number 1717.

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Date of creation: 1995
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Handle: RePEc:fth:harver:1717

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References

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  1. Dov Monderer & Dov Samet & Aner Sela, 2010. "Belief Affirming in Learning Processes," Levine's Working Paper Archive 420, David K. Levine.
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Cited by:
  1. JIMENEZ Edward, 2002. "Unified Game Theory," Computing in Economics and Finance 2002 25, Society for Computational Economics.
  2. Yannick Viossat & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2012. "No-regret Dynamics and Fictitious Play," Working Papers hal-00713871, HAL.
  3. Berger, Ulrich, 2007. "Brown's original fictitious play," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 572-578, July.
  4. Ulrich Berger, 2003. "A general model of best response adaptation," Game Theory and Information 0303008, EconWPA.
  5. Ulrich Berger, 2003. "Continuous Fictitious Play via Projective Geometry," Game Theory and Information 0303004, EconWPA.
  6. Ulrich Berger, 2004. "Two More Classes of Games with the Fictitious Play Property," Game Theory and Information 0408003, EconWPA.
  7. Ludwig, Alexander & Zimper, Alexander, 2007. "Attitude polarization," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 07-66, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  8. Alexander Zimper & Alexander Ludwig, 2009. "On attitude polarization under Bayesian learning with non-additive beliefs," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 181-212, October.
  9. Glen Ellison, 2010. "Learning from Personal Experience: One Rational Guy and the Justification of Myopia," Levine's Working Paper Archive 413, David K. Levine.
  10. Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov & Sela, Aner, 1997. "Belief Affirming in Learning Processes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 438-452, April.
  11. Ulrich Berger, 2003. "Fictitious play in 2xn games," Game Theory and Information 0303009, EconWPA.

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