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On the Convergence of Fictitious Play

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Author Info

  • Vijay Krishna

    (Penn State University)

  • Tomas Sjostrom

    (Harvard University)

Abstract

We study the continuous time Brown-Robinson fictitious play process f or non-zero sum games. We show that, in general, fictitious play cannot converg e cyclically to a mixed strategy equilibrium in which both players use more tha n two pure strategies.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9503003.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 13 Mar 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9503003

Note: 34 pages
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References

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  1. Dov Monderer & Dov Samet & Aner Sela, 2010. "Belief Affirming in Learning Processes," Levine's Working Paper Archive 420, David K. Levine.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Ulrich Berger, 2003. "Fictitious play in 2xn games," Game Theory and Information 0303009, EconWPA.
  2. Ulrich Berger, 2003. "Continuous Fictitious Play via Projective Geometry," Game Theory and Information 0303004, EconWPA.
  3. Alexander Zimper & Alexander Ludwig, 2007. "Attitude polarization," MEA discussion paper series 07155, Munich Center for the Economics of Aging (MEA) at the Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy.
  4. Dov Monderer & Dov Samet & Aner Sela, 2010. "Belief Affirming in Learning Processes," Levine's Working Paper Archive 420, David K. Levine.
  5. Ellison, Glenn, 1997. "Learning from Personal Experience: One Rational Guy and the Justification of Myopia," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 180-210, May.
  6. Ulrich Berger, 2004. "Two More Classes of Games with the Fictitious Play Property," Game Theory and Information 0408003, EconWPA.
  7. JIMENEZ Edward, 2002. "Unified Game Theory," Computing in Economics and Finance 2002 25, Society for Computational Economics.
  8. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00713871 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Alexander Zimper & Alexander Ludwig, 2009. "On attitude polarization under Bayesian learning with non-additive beliefs," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 181-212, October.
  10. Ulrich Berger, 2003. "A general model of best response adaptation," Game Theory and Information 0303008, EconWPA.
  11. Berger, Ulrich, 2007. "Brown's original fictitious play," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 572-578, July.

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