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No-regret Dynamics and Fictitious Play

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  • Yannick Viossat

    ()
    (CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision - CNRS : UMR7534 - Université Paris IX - Paris Dauphine)

  • Andriy Zapechelnyuk

    ()
    (QMUL - School of Economics and Finance - Queen Mary, University of London)

Abstract

Potential based no-regret dynamics are shown to be related to fictitious play. Roughly, these are epsilon-best reply dynamics where epsilon is the maximal regret, which vanishes with time. This allows for alternative and sometimes much shorter proofs of known results on convergence of no-regret dynamics to the set of Nash equilibria.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00713871.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Publication status: Published, Journal of Economic Theory, 2013, 148, 2, 825-842
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00713871

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Keywords: Regret minimization; no-regret strategy; fictitious play; best reply dynamics; Nash equilibrium; Hannan set; curb set;

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