This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

A General Class of Adaptive Strategies

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Sergiu Hart (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel)
Andreu Mas-Colell (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We exhibit and characterize an entire class of simple adaptive strategies, in the repeated play of a game, having the Hannan- consistency property: In the long-run, the player is guaranteed an average payoff as large as the best-reply payoff to the empirical distribution of play of the other players; i.e., there is no ``regret.'' Smooth fictitious play (Fudenberg and Levine [1995]) and regret-matching (Hart and Mas-Colell [2000]) are particular cases. The motivation and application of the current paper come from the study of procedures whose empirical distribution of play is, in the long-run, (almost) a correlated equilibrium. For the analysis we first develop a generalization of Blackwell's [1956a] approachability strategy for games with vector payoffs.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/9904/9904001.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no
File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/9904/9904001.ps.gz
File Format: application/postscript
File Function:
Download Restriction: no
File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/9904/9904001.tex
File Format: application/x-tex
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9904001.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 12 Apr 1999
Date of revision: 23 Mar 2000
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9904001

Note: Type of Document - Scientific Word v.2.5. First version: March 1999. Revised: December 1999.
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://129.3.20.41

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (EconWPA).

Related research
Keywords: adaptive strategies; approachability; correlated equilibrium; fictitious play; regret;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Foster, Dean P. & Vohra, Rakesh V., 1997. "Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 40-55, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2000. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1127-1150, September.
    Other versions:
  3. Foster, Dean P. & Vohra, Rakesh, 1999. "Regret in the On-Line Decision Problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 7-35, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999. "Conditional Universal Consistency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 104-130, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1995. "Consistency and cautious fictitious play," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 19(5-7), pages 1065-1089. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov & Sela, Aner, 1997. "Belief Affirming in Learning Processes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 438-452, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Nimrod Megiddo, 1979. "On Repeated Games with Incomplete Information Played by Non-Bayesian Players," Discussion Papers 373, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All top Economics journals are listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-5.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.