This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

On Repeated Games with Incomplete Information Played by Non-Bayesian Players

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Nimrod Megiddo

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/373.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: main text
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 373.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Mar 1979
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:373

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014
Phone: 847/491-3527
Fax: 847/491-2530
Email:
Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Fran Walker).

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1997. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9703006, EconWPA, revised 24 Mar 1997. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1999. "A General Class of Adaptive Strategies," Game Theory and Information 9904001, EconWPA, revised 23 Mar 2000. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Eric Friedman & Scott Shenker & Amy Greenwald, 1998. "Learning in Networks Contexts: Experimental Results from Simulations," Departmental Working Papers 199825, Rutgers University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1997. "Conditional Universal Consistency," Levine's Working Paper Archive 471, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Stefano, LOVO, 2007. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information," Les Cahiers de Recherche 884, Groupe HEC. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Apart from a small start up grant in the 1990's, RePEc has received no funding and lives on the help of volunteers.

This page was last updated on 2008-11-13.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.