Belief-free Equilibria in games with incomplete information
AbstractIn this paper, the authors define belief-free equilibria in two-player games with incomplete information as sequential equilibria for which players’ continuation strategies are best-replies, after every history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. They characterize a set of payoffs that includes all belief-free equilibrium payoffs. Conversely, any payoff in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HEC Paris in its series Les Cahiers de Recherche with number 845.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 01 May 2006
Date of revision:
game theory; equilibria; information;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-09-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-FMK-2006-09-16 (Financial Markets)
- NEP-GTH-2006-09-16 (Game Theory)
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