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On the role of chance moves and information in two-person games

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Listed:
  • Marcel Dreef
  • Peter Borm

Abstract

The value of information has been the subject of many studies in a strategic context.The central question in these studies is how valuable the information hidden in the chance moves of a game is for one or more of the players.Generally speaking, only the extra possibilities that are beneficial for the players have been considered so far.In this note we study the value of information for a special class of two-person games.For these games we also investigate how badly the players can do, both with and without knowing the result of the chance move. In this way one can determine to what extent the players are restricted in their possibilities by the fact that some information is hidden in the chance moves of the games.This allows for a comparison of the influence of the chance move to the control that the players have over the game result.
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Suggested Citation

  • Marcel Dreef & Peter Borm, 2006. "On the role of chance moves and information in two-person games," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 14(1), pages 75-98, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:topjnl:v:14:y:2006:i:1:p:75-98
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02579003
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    1. Jean-Pierre Ponssard & Sylvain Sorin, 1980. "The L-P formulation of finite zero sum games with incomplete information," Post-Print hal-00364266, HAL.
    2. PONSSARD, Jean-Pierre & ZAMIR, Shmuel, 1973. "Zero-sum sequential games with incomplete information," LIDAM Reprints CORE 149, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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    4. Reijnierse, J.H. & Borm, P.E.M. & Voorneveld, M., 2003. "Informationally Robust Equlibria," Discussion Paper 2003-14, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    5. Voorneveld, M., 1999. "Potential games and interactive decisions with multiple criteria," Other publications TiSEM 29d7b372-7a4e-4db7-b66c-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Jean-Pierre Ponssard, 1976. "On the Concept of the Value of Information in Competitive Situations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 22(7), pages 739-747, March.
    7. Marcel Dreef & Peter Borm & Ben van der Genugten, 2004. "A new relative skill measure for games with chance elements," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(5), pages 255-264.
    8. Peter Borm & Ben Genugten, 2001. "On a relative measure of skill for games with chance elements," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 9(1), pages 91-114, June.
    9. Borm, Peter & Garcia-Jurado, Ignacio & Potters, Jos & Tijs, Stef, 1996. "An amalgation of games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 89(3), pages 570-580, March.
    10. Jean-Pierre Ponssard & Sylvain Sorin, 1982. "Optimal Behavioral Strategies In 0-Sum Games with Almost Perfect Information," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 7(1), pages 14-31, February.
    11. Jean-Pierre Ponssard, 1975. "Zero-Sum Games with "Almost" Perfect Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 21(7), pages 794-805, March.
    12. Jean-Pierre Ponssard & Sylvain Sorin, 1981. "Optimal Strategies in zero sum games with almost perfect information," Post-Print hal-00363923, HAL.
    13. Marcel Dreef & Peter Borm & Ben van der Genugten, 2004. "Measuring skill in games: several approaches discussed," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 59(3), pages 375-391, July.
    14. Kamien, Morton I. & Tauman, Yair & Zamir, Shmuel, 1990. "On the value of information in a strategic conflict," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 129-153, June.
    15. Borm, P.E.M., 1988. "Information types : A comparison," Other publications TiSEM 0ddbc43d-3437-4f57-9e83-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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    1. van der Genugten, B.B. & Borm, P.E.M., 2014. "Cash and Tournament Poker : Games of Skill?," Other publications TiSEM edc02e9c-cda1-4531-b320-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Marcel Dreef & Peter Borm & Ben van der Genugten, 2004. "A new relative skill measure for games with chance elements," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(5), pages 255-264.
    3. van der Genugten, B.B. & Borm, P.E.M., 2014. "Texas Hold’em : A Game of Skill," Other publications TiSEM e5edc6e2-5cad-4e87-8158-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Games with almost perfect information; value of information; player control; 91A10;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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